

**THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY AGENCIES IN COUNTERING THREATS OF
TERRORISM IN UGANDA**

BY

ALOMU TIMOTHY

2014/AUG/MSS/M1406/WKD

A DESSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

AWARD OF A MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN SECURITY

AND STRATEGIC STUDIES OF

NKUMBA UNIVERSITY

OCTOBER, 2018

DECLARATION

I declare that the research presented in this dissertation is entirely mine and has been generated as a result of my hard work and effort towards achieving a Master of Arts degree in security and strategic studies. I also declare that this piece of work has never been presented to any university or institution of higher learning for any award.

Name: Alomu Timothy

Signature:Date:

APPROVAL

This is to certify that the research and paper work presented by Alomu Timothy for the award of Master of Arts degree in security and strategic studies has been under my supervision and is now ready for submission to the academic Board of Nkumba University for examination

Name: Mr. Mugumya Joash

Signature: Date:

DEDICATION

This piece of work is dedicated to my beloved parents; the late Mr. Richard and Christine Ekou as a memorial for being true fountains of inspiration to me during their life time here on planet earth and I wish their souls rest in eternal peace.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This research work was quite tedious and demanding therefore I would like to acknowledge the dedication rendered to me by my supervisor Mr. Mugumya Joash who kept on encouraging me not to give up until I finish. Gods help was also visibly present during the entire process which I appreciated so much.

I am also indebted to the following people whose various roles contributed immensely to the successful completion of this research study; my beloved wife Nambuya Mary, Brothers Charles Angina, Kalukusu Amos Ronald, Leku, Calvin, Amon and all those who have always wished me well in all my endeavors. May the almighty God bless you all?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	i
APPROVAL	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	v
LIST OF FIGURES	x
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	xiii
DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS	xv
ABSTRACT.....	xvi
CHAPTER ONE	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.0 Introduction.....	1
1.0.1 Historical Background of Terrorism.....	2
1.0.2 Various Definitions of terrorism.....	4
1.0.3 Global Trends of Terrorism	7
1.0.4 Theoretical Background of Terrorism	9
1.0.4.1 Anarchism as a theory of terrorism.....	9
1.0.4.2 Fascism as a Theory of Terrorism	10
1.0.4.3 Religion as a Theory of Terrorism.....	11
1.0.4.4 Psychological Theory of Terrorism	12
1.0.5 Contextual Perspective of Terrorism	13
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem	14
1.3 Objectives of the Study.....	14
1.3.1 General Objective	14
1.3.2 Specific Objectives	14
1.4 Research Questions	15
1.5 Justification of the Study	15
1.6 Significance of the Study	15
1.7 Scope of the Study	16
1.8 Limitations of the Study.....	16
1.9 Ethical Consideration.....	16

1.10 Conceptual Framework.....	18
CHAPTER TWO	21
LITERATURE REVIEW	21
2.0 Introduction.....	21
2.1 Perspectives of Terrorism	21
2.2 Changing Patterns of Terrorist Activity.....	22
2.3 Modern forms of Terrorism	22
2.4 Current Methods of Terrorist operations	24
2.5 Notable terrorist attacks	25
2.6 Sources of Terrorism funding	27
2.7 Role played by different security organs in fighting against terrorism at the international level.....	27
2.7.1 The United Nation’s Global Counter Terrorism Strategy.....	30
2.7.2 Researcher’s Comment on the above reviewed literature.....	32
2.7.3 Terrorism in Africa in General	36
2.8 Role played by security organs at the regional level	37
2.8.1 An Overview of Terrorism in West Africa.....	38
2.8.2 The New Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) strategy in Western Africa	39
2.9 Role played by security agencies at the Individual state level.....	40
2.10 Challenges of Fighting Terrorism Africa.....	40
2.10.1 The Role of Regional Economic Communities (REC) in fighting Terrorism in Africa. Case of (IGAD).....	42
2.10.1.1 Examples of Terrorism acts within the IGAD Region.....	43
2.10.2 Challenges of IGAD	44
2.11 Terrorism in East Africa	44
2.11.1 Role played by EAC states and their security Stakeholders	45
2.11.2 South African Development Community (SADC)	46
2.11.3 Terrorism in Uganda and the role played by security and other agencies at the national level.....	46
2.11.4 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).....	50
2.11.5 Constitutional mandates of Different Security agencies and other Stakeholders in Uganda	50

2.11.5.1 Public Security Organizations and their Roles	50
2.11.5.2 Uganda People’s Defense Forces.....	51
2.11.5.3 The Uganda Police Force (UPF).....	51
2.11.5.4 Security Organization’s Act CAP 305	51
2.11.5.5 Private Security Organizations	51
2.11.5.6 Crime Preventers.....	52
2.11.5.7 Research’s Comment in relation to the Constitutional mandates given to different Security agencies in Uganda.....	52
2.11.5.8 Gaps and challenges of fighting terrorism in General	53
2.11.6 The challenge of Institution Building in fighting terrorism.....	59
2.11.7 Challenge of fighting terrorist financing.....	60
2.11.8 The Challenge of Intensity (Strength).....	60
2.11.9 The Challenge of Ideals	60
CHAPTER THREE	62
METHODOLOGY	62
3.0 Introduction.....	62
3.1 Description of the Study Area.....	62
3.2 Research Design.....	62
3.3 Study Population and Sample Selection Procedure	63
3.3.1 Target Population.....	63
3.4 Sampling Procedures	64
3.4.1 Sample Size.....	64
3.4.2 Sampling Techniques.....	65
3.4.2.1 Purposive Sampling	65
3.4.2.2 Simple Random sampling	65
3.5 Data Collection	66
3.6 Data Collection Methods	66
3.6.1 Key Informant Interviewing (KII)	66
3.6.2 Focus Group Discussions.....	67
3.6.3 Observation	67
3.6.4 Documentary Review.....	67
3.7 Data entry and analysis	67
3.8 Ethical Consideration.....	68

3.8 Data Quality Control.....	68
3.8.1 Validity of Research Instruments.....	68
3.9 Reliability of Research Instruments.....	68
3.10 Validity and Reliability of the Results.....	68
CHAPTER FOUR.....	70
PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS.....	70
4.0 Introduction.....	70
4.1 Socio Demographic factors of the Respondents	70
4.1.1 Gender of the Respondents	70
4.1.2 Age of Respondents	71
4.1.3 Marital Status of the Respondents	72
4.2 Different roles played by security organs in countering terrorism activities in Uganda.	74
4.3 The existing security gaps contributing to the perpetration of terrorism crimes in Uganda...	80
4.4 Challenges faced by security agencies in the fight against terrorism in Uganda.....	82
4.4.1 The Challenge Relating to Intelligence Gathering.....	82
4.4.2 The challenge Posed by Human Rights Defenders/Organizations	82
4.4.3 Findings about the challenge of lack of proper tools and modern equipment for security agencies.....	83
4.4.4 Inadequate training of the security agencies	84
4.4.5 The Challenge of political interference by politicians in the operations of security agencies	84
4.4.6 Lack of cooperation from the public on security matters	85
4.4.7 Inadequate funding of security agencies.....	86
4.4.8 Investigating the Challenge of Uganda’s open door policy on migration	86
4.4.9 Challenge posed by the operations of private security organizations in the fights against potential threats of terrorism.....	87
4.4.10 Gauging the preparedness of Uganda security organs to guard against potential threats of terrorism	89
4.5 Validity and Reliability of the Results.....	90
CHAPTER FIVE	91
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	91
5.0 Introduction.....	91
5.1 Summary of Findings.....	91

5.2 Conclusion	92
5.3 Recommendations	92
5.4 Areas for further Research	93
References	94
Appendices	101
Appendix i: Interview and Focus Group Interview Guide.....	101
Appendix ii: Map of Kampala showing the areas of twin Bombings.....	102
Appendix (iii): Sample Size Determination.....	103
Appendix (iv): Self-administered Questionnaire	104

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 18

Figure 2: Age categorizations of Respondents 71

Figure 3: Level of Education of the Respondents..... 73

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Sampling Plan: Simple Random and Purposive Sampling.....	65
Table 2: Gender of the Respondents. N=180.....	70
Table 3: Marital status of Respondents, N=180	72
Table 4: Roles of security agencies in minimizing terrorism threats in Uganda, N=180.....	74
Table 5: Roles of Other stakeholders in minimizing terrorism threats in Uganda; N=180	75
Table 6: Should Security agencies collect, receive and process internal and external intelligence data on the security situation in the country?.....	76
Table 7: Responses on maintenance of law and order by security agencies	76
Table 8: Responses on whether security agencies effectively combat and prevent crime in Uganda	77
Table 9: Correlation between level of training and Access control in public environments	77
Table 10: Coefficients on access control: Regression Analysis	78
Table 11: Model Summary in Regression Analysis on Effectiveness of security Agencies	78
Table 12: Coefficients on determinants of the effectiveness of security agencies	79
Table 13: ANOVA ^a	79
Table 14: Responses on whether there are existing gaps in the fight against terrorism in Uganda	80
Table 15: Major Gaps which need to be addressed by security agencies in minimizing terrorism threats in Uganda	80
Table 16: Are there any challenges relating to intelligence gathering?.....	82
Table 17: Is there any challenge posed by human rights defenders/Organizations?	83
Table 18: Is there a lack of proper tools and modern equipment for security agencies?.....	83
Table 20: Is the inadequate training of the security agencies a challenge?	84
Table 21: Is there a challenge of political interference by politicians in the operations of security agencies?.....	85
Table 22: Is there any lack of cooperation on security matters?.....	85
Table 23: Inadequate funding of security agencies.....	86
Table 24: Is Uganda's open door policy on migration a Security Challenge?	87
Table 25: Is there any challenge posed by the operations of private security organizations in the fights against potential threats of terrorism in Uganda?	87
Table 26: Challenges faced by security agencies in minimizing terrorism threats in Uganda	88
Table 27: Preparedness of Uganda security organs	89

Table 28: Case Processing Summary for Validity and Reliability Test	90
Table 29: Reliability Statistics	90

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADF - Allied Democratic Forces

AMISOM - African Mission in Somalia

AOG- Army of God

BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation

CDC- Center for Disease Control

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

CNN- Cable News Network

DOS - Denial of service attacks

DRC - Democratic Republic of the Congo

EODS - Explosive Ordinance Devices

FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigations

FFI - Norwegian Defense Research Establishment

GTD - Global Terrorism Database

GTI- Global Terrorism Index

IDSA – Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis

IED - Improvised Explosive Devises

IEP - Institute for Economics & Peace

IRA - Irish Republic Army

ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

LRA - Lord's Resistance Army

NLFT - National Liberation Front of Tripura

PFLP - Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PKK - Kurdish workers party

PLO- Palestine Liberation organization

PSO – Private Security Organizations

SPSS - Statistical Package for Social Sciences

TNT – Trinitrotoluene

UBOS - Uganda Bureau of Statistics

UN- United Nations

WMDs - Weapons of mass destruction

Definition of Key terms

Effectiveness: The capability of producing a desired result or the ability to produce desired output. When something is deemed effective, it means it has an intended or expected outcome, or produces a deep, vivid impression (Wikipedia, 2017)

Terrorism: Terrorism is the premeditated and unlawful use of violence against a non-combatant population or target having symbolic significance, with an aim of either inducing political change through intimidation and destabilization or destroying a population identified as an enemy” (Forst, 2009).

Security Agency: Security agency” means any person engaged in the business of rendering services relating to the security of any property, whether movable or immovable, or of any person, in any manner and includes the services of investigation, detection or verification, of any fact or activity, whether of a personal nature or otherwise, including the services of providing security personnel.

Terrorist Threat: A terroristic threat is a crime generally involving a threat to commit violence communicated with the intent to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a building, or to cause serious public inconvenience, in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience (US Legal.com, 2017).

Security intelligence: Security intelligence (SI) is the information relevant to protecting an organization from external and inside threats as well as the processes, policies and tools designed to gather and analyze that information.

Intelligence Agency: An intelligence agency is a government agency responsible for the collection, analysis, and exploitation of information in support of law enforcement, national security, military, and foreign policy objectives (Szoldra, 2013).

ABSTRACT

This study focused on an assessing the effectiveness of security agencies in Uganda to minimize potential threats of terrorism. The study was guided by four objectives and data collection was done using self-administered questionnaires in across sectional research design. The findings of the study revealed a positive relationship between the variables studied and the effectiveness of security agencies [R =0.513, P =0.004 < 0.05]. The adjusted R²= 0.2634 for the combined variables which translated into 51.0% and this indicated that the effectiveness of security stakeholders depend largely on access control, deployment of security, surveillance by intelligence personnel and level of training. The study also revealed that some gaps such as porous borders, laxity of security personnel, and ignorance of majority people about security matters. In addition, weak immigration laws, and poor coordination of security agencies, corruption and lack of required training still exist within the security agencies and these could compromise the security of the state if not addressed expeditiously. There are also other challenges such as less funding to security institutions, low motivation, political and human rights interferences. In order to mitigate some of these challenges, the study recommended the training of security personnel and other stakeholders in security to equip them with required knowledge and advanced skills in the fight against terrorism, intelligence agencies should cooperate among themselves and the community by sharing intelligence information in terrorism related crimes, community policing and neighborhood watch should be intensified by sensitizing the public on security matters.

Keywords: Terrorism, Effectiveness, Security, Potential threats

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

Generally, the act of terrorism has turned out to be one of the most global concerns due to its socio-economic and political devastating effects to mankind. Many scholars and researchers have tried their best to find out what terrorists think about other human beings, why they resort to do what they are doing on daily basis and have tried to explore avenues to bring to an end to all these inhuman actions of terrorism.

This study comprehensively focused on an assessment of the effectiveness of Uganda's security methods of work in their endeavor to counter terrorism visa-a-vie the current sophisticated methods of terrorists operations globally. The study primarily examined several advanced methods currently employed by terrorists, the activities which the security apparatus and other stakeholders have put in place to counter terrorism in Uganda. It also examined the loopholes which have been exploited by the terrorists as well as challenges faced by these agencies in their effort to prevent terrorism acts in the country. The findings of the study therefore, led the researcher to come up with suggestions and recommendations that would help to bridge the gaps and inform different security agencies to come up with more sustainable modus operandi to counter potential threats of terrorism in Uganda. This chapter therefore presents an analysis of the construct of terrorism as a phenomenon with historical roots, many contestations, explanations, and understanding. It highlights the historical background of terrorism activities at the global, continental, regional, and national levels. Some theories about terrorism were looked at as well as the contextual perspective of terrorism. The purpose of the study, problem statement, overall objectives, and specific objectives, and research questions, justification of the study/research, significance of the study, scope, conceptual framework, and professional ethical considerations are also captured in the same chapter.

1.0.1 Historical Background of Terrorism

The history of terrorism is a history of well-known and historically significant individuals, entities, and incidences associated, whether rightly or wrongly, with terrorism, scholars agree that terrorism is a disputed term, and very few of those labeled terrorists describe themselves as such.

The roots and practice of terrorism according to Schmidt (2004) can be traced at least to the 1st Century AD Sicarri Zealots, though some dispute whether the group which Associated collaborators with Roman Rule in the province of Judea, was in fact Terrorists. During this period, the Jewish Zealots rebelled, killing prominent collaborators with Roman rule. The Sicarri (dagger men) an off shot of the Zealots would hide shot daggers under their cloaks, mingle with crowds at large festivals, murder their victims, and then disappear into the packed crowds.

According to Fortion (2008), terrorism was formally practiced by distinct organizational entities (secular Groups) with established chains of command and a defined set of political, social, and economic objectives. This group often issued communiqués explaining in full detail their actions. Most significantly, however, the terrorist groups were engaged in highly selective and discriminate acts of violence directed against a comparatively narrow range of targets, moreover, rarely did these groups venture outside their self-proclaimed operational areas to carry out attacks. For example, Palestinian and Lebanese terrorists frequently operated in Europe and the Middle East where their locus of international terrorism remained firmly entrenched for nearly three decades. The Irish Republic Army (IRA) terrorists also concentrated in Britain and Northern Island, only occasionally did terrorism spill over into Asia and Latin America.

Fortion (2008) further states that terrorism is now transitional, no country in the globe can now feel completely secure. Terrorism groups have emerged motivated by a religious imperative (Command) with the intention of inflicting widespread, indiscriminate casualties and destruction coupled with the lack of a discernible organizational structure with a distinguishable command chain behind the attackers. Friedman (2003) explains that no country today facing the threat of terrorism and the fear of terrorist's use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) can afford to rest on battles won in previous conflicts or short term success.

According to Hoffman (2006), the word terrorism was coined in the English language during the French Revolution's reign of terror, which lasted between September 5th 1793, and July 28th 1794. In the reign of terror, a group of rebels, the Jacobins who controlled government at that

time, used the term when self-reflexively portraying their own actions in their explanation of the French Revolution. The reign of terror was a campaign of large-scale violence by the Jacobins which included mass executions, guillotine to compel obedience to the state and to intimidate regime enemies. It is estimated that between 16,000 and 40,000 people were killed in a little over a year. Among the guillotined were Louise XVI and Marie Antoinette. It is not surprising, then, that the French National Convention proclaimed in September 1793 “terror is the order of the day” putting an end to the Terror on July 28th 1794, was when it’s well known leader, Maximilien Robes Pierre was himself guillotined by members of France ruling National Convention as Hoffman (2006) explains. Since then, the term has been used to refer to different forms of political violence by different actors.

Boaz (2009) states that terrorism became an issue on the international agenda in 1934 when the League of Nations took the first major step towards making terrorism highly illegal and punishable. In doing so, it drafted a convention for the prevention and punishment of terrorists in 1937. A few years later, the Stern Gang, a militant Zionist group founded by Abraham Stern, was making headlines. The group’s objective was to expel the British authorities from Palestine, allow unlimited immigration of Jews, and create a Jewish state. A similar Jewish terrorist group, Irgun, operated in the British mandated territory of Palestine between 1931 and 1948. A notorious Irgun act was the bombing of the King David Hotel (the headquarters of the British Forces in Palestine) in Jerusalem in 1946, killing ninety-one people.

Hoffman (2006) explained that, Worldwide, many governments are incredibly averse to defining what terrorism is because they are worried about how an official definition of terrorism would expose the legitimacy of self-proclaimed combatants of national liberation. In certain countries, the word has become virtually synonymous with political opponents. For instance, the Chinese call pacific Tibetan Buddhists vicious terrorists. In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe regarded the democratic opposition in a similar fashion.

Therefore, Hoffman (2006) noted that, terrorism is an uncomplimentary term used to define the unwanted chaotic behaviours. When people employ this term, they characterize their enemies’ actions as something evil and lacking human compassion. Terrorism is considered worse than war, torture, or murder. It is a pejorative term that is fraught with negative and derogatory meanings.

1.0.2 Various Definitions of terrorism

Several authors have put forth different definitions on terrorism and some of the most notable are discussed here.

Laqueur (2007) explained that many attempts have been put across by different scholars to define what terrorism is all about, but there has been no specific, agreeable, and standard definition of terrorism. This may be due to the fact that very few of these labeled as terrorists describe themselves as such. World over, various legal systems and government agencies use different definitions for the word and several governments have been so reluctant to formulate an agreed upon legally binding definition. These difficulties rise from the fact that, the term terrorism is politically and emotionally charged.

Hoffman (2006) further noted that, studies have found more than 200 definitions of terrorism. In fact, Jeffrey (1994) presented at least 212 different definitions of terrorism that exist across the world; 90 of them are recurrently used by governments and other institutions. Schmidt et-al. (1988), researchers at the University of Leiden (Netherlands), adopted a social science approach to figure out how to best define terrorism. They gathered over a hundred academic and official definitions of terrorism and examined them to identify the main components. They discovered that the concept of violence emerged in 83.5% of definitions; political goals emerged in 65%; causing fear and terror in 51%; arbitrariness and indiscriminate targeting in 21%; and the victimization of civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, or outsiders in 17.5%. What Schmidt and Hoffman actually did was a content analysis of those definitions.

The League of Nations Convention (1937) defined terrorist acts as “all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public. The United Nations 2004 Secretary General’s report describes terrorism as any act intended to cause death or serious injury or body harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating or compelling government and internal organs to do or abstain from doing an act.

Horgan (2005) attempted to define terrorism as a clinical term which refers to a psychological state of constant dread or fearfulness, associated with an abnormally high level of psycho-physiological arousal. This is central to what terrorists aim to achieve, since after all, while they

have some ultimate set of political objectives, it is an immediate goal of most terrorist groups to cause terror.

The Global Terrorism Index (2015) defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.

In the researcher's opinion, terrorism is a violent act motivated by various reasons by its perpetrators which range from political, social, economic, religious, ethnic, and other factors. In addition, the acts of terrorism are designed to intimidate, inflict pain, and cause fear to the public in order to advance a goal of the perpetrators. since the advent of terrorism the use of the term has undergone various semantic transformations, shifting from the "regime delaterrreus" reign of terror during the French revolution when it was first used according to (Schmid, 2004) to anarchists and social-revolutionary bombers in the nineteenth century, to the red terror to anti-colonial struggle, then to the Palestinians struggles in 1960s, and finally to religious fundamentalism since the 1990s, to date. The evolution of the term has brought about problems in understanding its causality and conceptualization and by implication in articulating an approach to finding a panacea.

This definitional conundrum is discerningly dubbed the "Bermuda triangle of Terrorism" by Brian Jenkes of the RAND Corporations, One of the first researchers in the field of Terrorism O'Neill (2002) noted that ,while some states considered defining terrorism to be important given their quest to address the causes , others considered such an attitude as recognizing and justifying terrorism Hence, the definition impasse is arguably rather political than semantics given its connectedness to "root causes" debate on terrorism.

The prevailing idea/cliché that a person's terrorist is another ones freedom fighter according to Primoratz, (2004) is another salient factor underscoring the difficulty with labeling certain acts as terrorism as opposed to other acts. Some justify terrorism as the sole weapon available to the political powerless to express and if not addressing their grievances against the perception of inequality and oppression, however, terrorism is widely viewed as a contested concept especially among scholars and policy makers.

In the researcher's view, terrorism appears to be a tactic employed to achieve a particular objective which may be political, economic, social or cultural or one way of forcing the opponent to come to the negotiating table.

According to the US, state Department, terrorism constitutes "premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Richardson, (2011) states that acts of terrorism are commonly expressed in the form of indiscriminate bombing, armed assaults on civilians, focused assassinations, kidnapping, hostage-taking and hijacking. These acts of terrorism tend to have mixed feelings within the general public as they normally cause great pain to some while others are left jubilating for having achieved their objective.

Molten, (2010) argues that there are several background reasons why people join or support terrorism, some of which include; economic desperations, political repression, and the ready presence of a framing Religious ideology., a revolution of rising frustrations as people are forced by poverty, hopelessness, and a sense of frustration to join extremist organizations on top of other environmental factors. This usually causes dilemma to some policy makers at different levels to come up with appropriate solutions on how to counter terrorism activities because as one scholar stated that, 'One man's terrorist is another one's freedom fighter.'

Citing from a presentation prepared by Dr. Kshiti Prabha, Associate Fellow at the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA) on terrorism (2015), she asserted that terrorism is a global phenomenon which is easy to recognize but difficult to define. Scholars all over the world define it according to their socio economic and political conditions. Those affected by social and economic problems conceptualize terrorism in the society as conflicts between the haves and have not, whereas those exercising the use of terror tactics to gain political mileage consider it as a political phenomenon. Apparently, terrorism is interpreted to suit different interests.

In fact, terrorism continues to pervade political systems because of the controversy surrounding it hence no punitive actions against the perpetrators are possible either by the governments or by the international organizations which is a challenge. Although of late, some nations have legislated some acts which spell out punishment for terrorism acts. An example is Uganda's Anti-terrorism Act 2002 which has helped to solve a legal problem the country was facing with

terrorism suspects. In the modern times, terrorism is considered as a major threat to the society and therefore illegal under the anti-terrorism laws in most jurisdictions (Lutz et al.2008).

A 2004 report by the Secretary General of the United Nations described terrorism as any act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating the population or compelling an international organization to abstain from doing an act.

Hoffman (1998) noted that terrorism is a pejorative word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one's enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore. Hence, the decision to call someone or label some organizations as terrorists becomes almost unavoidably subjective, depending largely on whether one sympathizes with or opposes the person/groups. When discussing terrorism today, expressions like criminals, fundamentalists, extremist beliefs, radicalism, acts of violence tend to appear frequently. Terrorism according to Sandler et al (2012) is premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or sub national groups to obtain social and political objective through intimidation of large audience beyond that of immediate victims. This definition is consistent with the one presented by Rand (2012).

In summary therefore, much as there is no internationally accepted uniform definition of the word terrorism as noted by Fortion, (2008) the common understanding by different scholars shows that the act of terrorism is associated with destruction of properties, loss of lives, usage of weapons, threats and sophisticated attacks to the government and unarmed population. It is therefore a known fact that terrorism is a strategy which is used or employed by different groups of people including state and non-state actors to advance their cause and they usually employ brutal methods to execute their mission that includes, assassinations, roadside bombs, suicide bombing, drive by shooting, kidnap, chemical attacks, hostage taking, plane hijack, among others.

1.0.3 Global Trends of Terrorism

Terrorism has turned out to be the most humanitarian threat in this time whereby; only within a single year of 2014, the world experienced a 61% increase in terrorist attacks according to the 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report from the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP).

The same report covers 99.6% of the world's population and ranks 162 countries based on the impact of terrorist activities along with analysis of economic and social factors."

Important to note, Global Terrorism Index report further states that approximately 17,958 people were killed in terrorist attacks in 2012 alone, and of those deaths, 82% occurred in just 5 nations: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Syria.

Of the 162 surveyed nations, Iraq holds the deplorable top spot with approximately 2,492 terrorist attacks in 2013, which killed 6,362 people. The numbers have since then increased due to the heightened activities of terrorism there. The overwhelming method of carrying out these attacks has been mainly through Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). It should also be noted that since 2000, only 5% of these crimes were suicide attacks or suicide bombing. Still according to the Global Terrorist Index (2015), 50 countries in the world went through the bitter test of terrorism activities in the recent times.

In relation to the above, at the global level, one cannot forget to talk about September 11th 2001 bombing of American World Trade Center and the Pentagon attributed to Al-Qaeda group, December 2010 Stockholm attacks carried out by an Iraqi-born Swedish citizen using a suicide car blowing himself up, May 2014 Brussels attack carried out at a Jewish museum where 4 people were killed and the November 2015 Paris attack where a number of casualties were recorded and many other terrorists' attacks which have occurred globally stand out to be very good examples. Similarly, there have been numerous acts of terrorism in many other countries in Europe, Asia, Middle East, Latin America and African nations and some of this include terrorist attacks in Spain, Britain, Turkey, DR Congo, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Niger, Algeria, Mali, among others. In East Africa alone, the world witnessed deadly attacks of US Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania respectively in 1998, Westgate shopping mall attack in 2013, Carissa University attack in 2015. At the national level, on July 11th 2010, Uganda woke up with incurable news following the unforgettable twin bombings of Kampala city suburbs where infamous Somali based Al-Shabaab terrorists claimed responsibility for the attacks. The attacks were interpreted as being plotted by Somali based Al-Shabaab to punish Uganda for sending troops to Somalia under the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Before 2010 attacks, Uganda's 20 years Lord Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) which were listed among the global list of terrorists have been

committing acts of terrorism in the country. Specifically the LRA committed many terrorist atrocities in the Northern parts of the country with a political motive to establish a government based on ten commandment of the Old Testament bible, while the ADF aimed at establishing the Islamic state in Uganda as noted by Poole (2006) . The ADF on the other hand were responsible for terrorist attacks in the western parts of Uganda and Kampala city in the late 1990s to date.

1.0.4 Theoretical Background of Terrorism

A theory according to Ross et-al (2010) is a set of ideas or related concepts which can be used to explain and understand an event, situation, or social phenomena.

Various theories have been advanced by many scholars to try to explain the concept of terrorism, some of which include; Anarchism, Biological theory, Economic theory of rational choice, Fascism, Religion as a theory, Psychological theory, Globalization, Traditional Criminological theories, Sociological theories, Psychiatric theories and others. The researcher therefore felt it necessary to explain a few of the above mentioned theories which he believed to be more relevant to the topic of study.

1.0.4.1 Anarchism as a theory of terrorism

According to Bob and Ross (2010), the word anarchy means the absence of government or control in society, disorder, or confusion. Burton (1978) in describing anarchism states that it is a theory of governance that rejects any form of central or external authority, preferring to replace it with alternative forms or organizations such as shaming rituals for deviants, natural assistance pacts between citizens, syndicalism and others. It is a political belief that there should be no laws or government, rejection of the state of any form of coercive government, of any form of domination and exploitation. It should be the nation of free and equal access to all the worlds' resources to enable positive freedom (freedom to) in place of negative freedom (freedom from).

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, a French politician and the founder of mutualistic philosophy contributed the idea of finding the “moment” as in when the moment is ripe for revolutionary action.

Hass et-al (1982) explain that Mikhail Bakunin, popularized the idea of propaganda by “deed” or letting your actions speak for themselves which was a theory originally developed by Carlo Pisacanean, an Italian revolutionary who argued that ideas spring from deeds and not the other way round. Bakunin laid down six steps necessary to destroy a social structure: kill the

intelligentsia, kidnap the rich and powerful, infiltrate the politicians, help the guilty criminals, defend the loud mouths, and nurture the supporters. Another anarchist, Sergei Nachaev an associate of Bakunin, glorified the “Merciless” aspect of destruction while other figures according to Hass (1982) such as Charles Gallo, Auguste Vaillante, advocate the idea that to have the most effect, the target must be innocents.

It is important therefore to note that anarchism as a theory holds a unique place in history because it was the first revolutionary movement to come up with systematic ideas about the purpose of agitation and some of these ideas are recognized as terrorist tactics.

The philosophy of anarchism is therefore based on the spirit of voluntary cooperation amongst societies with a view that they can withdraw from it at their own will, other than being controlled by the government at the center which tends to coerce them against their will. In relation to topic under investigation, this theory therefore informs us that in the absence of an organized government with manageable security agencies, terrorism can be rampant instigated by anarchical tendencies.

1.0.4.2 Fascism as a Theory of Terrorism

Oxford Advanced Learner’s dictionary 8th edition defines fascism as an extreme right wing political system or attitude which favors strong central authority and does not allow freedom of speech. Passmore (2002) defines fascism as the consolidation of an ultranationalist ideology that is unabashedly racist. The word comes from the Latin: fasces” which means to use power to scare or impress people. It generally refers to the consolidation of an economic and political power into some form of super-patriotism that is devoted to genocide or endless war with one’s enemies. Benito Mussolini (Italy) who practically invented the term in 1922 said it is the merger of state and corporate power. Adolf Hitler of Germany said fascism is the clever and constant application of propaganda so that the people can be made to see paradise as hell, and the other way round. Islamo-fascism can be traced to the time of the birth of Nazi national socialist fascism in 1928 when the Muslim brotherhood was formed in reaction to the 1924 abolition of the caliphate by the Turks. The term Islamic fascism is therefore a better term best used to describe the agenda of contemporary radical Islam.

Fascism supports terrorism at home and abroad where charismatic leaders are often given supreme powers to crackdown on dissidents, peace makers and anyone who does not abide by the “cult of the individual” which worships a He-man mentality and the party line.

Cohen (1975) notes that, Fascism appeals to the frustrations and resentments of a race of people who think they ought to have a bigger place at the global table. When combined with an anti – western slant (the United States as Satan), fascism becomes a means of social identity (pan-Africanism, Islamo-fascism, pan Arabism) as well as a facilitator of terrorism. Frustrated fascists who fail to gain control in their own countries have historically turned to terrorism. In relation to the topic under investigation, one can note that fascists tendencies concentrate political power to an individual who tends to dictate his/her will over the society which in turn results into resentment and retaliation in form of assassinations, banditry and other violent actions which tantamount to terrorism which if it is to be minimized calls for security strengthening in the country.

1.0.4.3 Religion as a Theory of Terrorism

Stitt (2003) and Kraemer (2004) point out that the disciplines of theology, religion and philosophy have had important things to say about terrorism. Hoffman (1993) stated that a significant percentage of the most dangerous groups of terrorism on earth are primarily motivated by religious concerns. Juergesmeyer (2001) believes that most religions and traditions are filled with plenty of violent images at their core, and destruction or self-destruction is a central part of the logic behind religious based terrorism. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of religion as a theory of terrorism in the researcher’s observation is how a devoted believer could come to mix politics and religion in such away. The answer could be in the conception of worship. Religion is used as a physiological tool to brainwash the people who commit acts of terrorism with a view that their actions please God and in return, rewards await them in heaven and they are also regarded as martyrs by those who subscribe to their ideology. Those who subscribe to religious ideology believe that God not only approves of their action, but that God demands their action. The course is sacred and consists of a combined sense of hope for the future and vengeance for the past. The trick to the successful use of terrorism in the name of religion rests upon convincing believers or convertees that a neglected duty exists in the fundamental mainstream part of the religion.

Religious terrorism can be quite extreme in its tactics, not only does it strive to avenge a long history of persecution, and injustices, but it frequently carries out preemptive attacks. This is because a high level of paranoia is usually maintained about the actual degree of threat that the enemy tends to pose.

Juergesmeyer (2001) explains that Religious terrorists are usually driven by doctrinal differences of opinion over interpretation of Holy Scriptures. These results into two things

(i) A rather non-selective target pattern, lashing out blindly, often harming innocents and (ii) the creation of numerous off shoots, spin offs or fringe groups who believe they are commanded to follow a different mission imperative. Add to this the fact that most adherents have already long felt like alienated and marginalized members of society and you`ve a recipe for perhaps the most dangerous or prolific kind of terrorism in the world today.

However, political events also serve as catalysts for religious terrorism and these are usually tied into whatever messianic traditions the religion has. For example, the rise of al-ikhawn Muslim militancy can be traced to a date in 1979 (during the Islamic year 1400) when the return of the prophet Madhi was expected at the grand mosque in Mecca. Adherents of the belief stormed the mosque by force which happened to coincide with a time for pilgrimage and a height for tourism season. The government reacted by forcing the militants out, cementing forever a date of infamy in which the group become certain that the homeland needed rescuing from secularization.

Religious terrorists also typically have “mourning” periods or dates such as anniversary of the martyrs because these activities are important ways the group recruits true believers from those who have been standing on the sidelines. Recruitment generally is followed by a re-education program that changes the way a person thinks about good and evil. Anything foreign, secular, or modern without question becomes evil, and anything supporting an all- out uncompromising struggle with the enemy. Including the killing of innocents, becomes good.

1.0.4.4 Psychological Theory of Terrorism

Merari (1990) in his summary on the psychological knowledge about terrorism stated that most terrorist feel that they are doing nothing wrong when they kill and injure people. They seem to share a feature of the psychological condition known as antisocial personality disorder or psychopathic personality disorder which is reflected by an absence of empathy for the suffering

of others. However, they do not appear unstable or mentally ill for this. A common feature is a type of thinking such as “I am good and right. You are bad and wrong” it is a very polarized thinking from opponents and makes it easier for them to kill people.

In the researcher’s opinion, this is a form of extremist thinking which may be associated with religious beliefs, political ideas, social, cultural norms that one embraces and disregards or becomes intolerant to any contrary views and are willing to violently confront any person or system that are not in tandem with their views.

1.0.5 Contextual Perspective of Terrorism

Moten (2010) argues that while terrorism in its initial stages was predominately confined to particular nations, it has since assumed a more international scope spreading across the world covering both developed and developing states, with common drivers varying from social, economic, political, cultural, environmental, religious among other factors. Globalization trends and the transnational nature of crimes arguably explain this latter dimension. We now hear people talk about, home grown terrorism, international terrorism as well as transnational terrorism. All this have been facilitated by technological advancements in transportation and communication systems. Uganda for example has experienced acts of terrorism which are related to religion and politics as drivers. The terrorist groups in Uganda such as the Allied Democratic forces and lord’s resistance army have a religious inclination to their terrorist’s activities in the country. The ADF wants to promote the Islamic religion in Uganda while the LRA is bent to overthrow the current government of Uganda and replace it with a religious government ruled by the 10 commandments of the holy bible.

For the case of Al-Shabaab terrorists their grievances with the government of Uganda is because of her involvement in AMISON in Somali since 2007 which the terrorists believe is an interference with their cause of establishing the Islamic state in Somali ruled by strict laws of sharia. The terrorists threat levels in Uganda keep on changing from time to time, from low to high and vice-versa and this truly poses reasons for concern as to how prepared is the country in dealing with such potential threats as well as allaying the fears of the population that a repeat of the July 10, 2010 attacks will not re-occur. Both the ADF and the LRA are still alive and active though with less strength as before, the country cannot still ignore the potential of these insurgent groups to build more capacity and re-launch their terrorist activities in Uganda if adequate measures are not put in place to counter them. Considering the prevailing situations, the

researcher was prompted to carry out research on the above mentioned topic to establish facts on the ground and to find solutions to the problem identified. Terrorism remains unpredictable in part because of its multiple contexts and dynamics as well as secrecy involved in its planning.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

On July 11th 2010, suspected Somali based Al-Shabaab terrorists attacked crowds at Kyadondo Rugby club, in Lugogo and Ethiopian village restaurant and bar at Kabalagala in Kampala city suburbs during the final world cup football tournament that was taking place in South Africa between Spain and the Netherlands. The cruel act which left 76 people dead and several others injured created a number of unanswered questions about Uganda's security preparedness in the fight against terrorism which is now a Global phenomenon. Much as security agencies appear to be doing their best to protect the state and the citizens of Uganda, there are still threats of terrorism activities in the country. Therefore, the research thought necessary to carry out the study to establish the effectiveness of security agencies and to identify any gaps or challenges if any in order to find solutions.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The research was guided by general and specific objectives.

1.3.1 General Objective

The general of the study was:

To gather comprehensive information about Uganda's security effectiveness to counter terrorists advanced methods of operation, to come up with recommendations that can help in detecting and preventing acts of terrorism, so as to protect people's lives and property in Uganda.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The research was aimed at fulfilling the following objectives;

- (i) To examine different roles played by security organs and other stakeholders in countering terrorism activities in Uganda.
- (ii) To find out the existing security gaps contributing to the perpetration of terrorism crimes in Uganda.
- (iii) To identify challenges faced by security agencies in the fight against terrorism in Uganda.

1.4 Research Questions

The research was aimed at giving answers to the following questions,

- (i) What roles are played by security organs and other stakeholders in countering terrorism activities in Uganda?
- (ii) What are the gaps that exist and contribute to the perpetration of terrorism crimes in Uganda?
- (iii) What challenges are faced by different security agencies in the fight against terrorism in Uganda?

On the one hand, the null hypothesis was investigated on the account that the existence or absence of an effective security in the country yields no impact towards preventing terrorism threats. On the other hand, the study investigated the alternative hypothesis on the account that the existence of effective security agencies in the country is of immense importance and contributes to the reduction of terrorism threats. The findings are discussed in chapter four.

1.5 Justification of the Study

According to Givens (2008), research justification refers to the rationale for the research, or the reason why the research is being conducted, including an explanation for the design and methods employed in the research. The Justification describes the gaps in knowledge that the study seeks to address. The researcher believed that, this study was justifiable because the security of the country is the main pillar of sustainable peace and development for its citizens. The terrorist's attacks that were carried in Kampala have created lasting pain in the hearts of many Ugandans who lost their loved ones. In addition, any gaps and challenges within the security apparatus may throw the country into social, economic, and political instability which may in turn scare away potential investors and disrupt the general economic performance of the country. It is therefore imperative to note that the findings of the study are most likely to address loopholes which may be exploited by the terrorists to disrupt Uganda's peace and stability.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The significance of the study according to Nicholas (2011) refers to the usefulness, relevance, benefit, values or applicability of the study. It will address questions such as how will the results be used, who will benefit from these results? Is it worth the time, effort, and expense? The findings of this study therefore will be very functional because all the information gathered will help to provide knowledge and understanding to security agencies and other stakeholders on how

to bridge the gaps within their institutions and specifically in countering terrorism and other related crimes. The study also will provide suggestions and recommendations to the policy makers and other stakeholders to make informed decisions based on the information provided by the research study. Different security agencies will be able to play their roles accordingly in order to minimize the risk of reoccurrence of terrorist attacks in the country more so it will contribute in providing knowledge for academics as well as the public.

1.7 Scope of the Study

The study was carried in Kampala Metropolitan area with specific interests centered on respondents from: Kyadondo rugby club, Ethiopian Village, Key Security offices within Kampala City, Immigration department, Hotels, Supermarkets, Bus parks, Churches, Restaurants and Residential areas within Kampala metropolitan area. The study was confined within the specific objectives of the study, that is to say, roles, challenges and gaps. The study was covered a period of 22 years (1995 to 2017). This period was chosen because of the historical perspectives of terrorism activities which occurred during that time.

1.8 Limitations of the Study

Limitations according to Mugenda (2003) are some aspects which negatively affect the results of the study but over which the researcher probably has no control. The researcher experienced a few challenges during data collection, as some respondents were not freely willing to divulge much information about the topic of the study for fear of being victimized by authorities, much as the researcher had labored to explain the purpose of the study. There was also limitation of resources in terms of finance to move around collecting data. The time frame for data collection and processing was not adequate as the researcher also had other personal obligations to attend to.

1.9 Ethical Consideration

Leedy (1997), states that ethical considerations pivot to fairness, honesty, openness of intent, disclosure of method, confidentiality, guarantees, voluntary and informed consent.


Bell et al (1999), explain that, it is important that strict ethical standards be maintained at all times when collecting data. Based on the principle of informed consent whereby people who are going to take part in the research are consenting to understand what they are participating in, the researcher had to provide a copy of Nkumba University introduction letter for research to the

relevant authorities in charge of the participants who were selected for the study. This was necessary in order to avoid being intrusive, avoid misconceptions that may arise, or any undesirable consequences. Participants were given their freedom to choose to provide information or withdraw their participation at any time in case of change of mind as the ethics of social research is about creating mutually respectful win-win relationships in which the participants are pleased to respond freely in order to produce valid results. The participants were also assured of confidential treatment of any information provided by them and protection of their identity from exposure to any potential dangers. This was also vital in the process of data collection. Questions about any aspect of the study which were not clear to any participants were also clearly explained by the researcher.

1.10 Conceptual Framework

The study was conducted basing on the conceptual framework given in figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



Fain (2004) defines a conceptual framework as an analytical tool with several variations and contexts. It is used to make conceptual distinction and to organize ideas. Fain (2004) further suggested that where a framework is based on concepts, the framework should be called a conceptual framework, and where it is based on theories, it should be called a theoretical

framework. Fulton and Krainovich (2010) describe a framework as a map for a study, giving a rationale for the development of research questions or hypotheses. Robson (2002) stated that conceptual framework is often developed as a diagram.

A variable on the other hand according to Bogere and Eggesa (2015) is a factor or characteristic of interest that the research would like to handle, observe, or manipulate in the study, for example age, gender etc. In the researchers study, the variables in the topic to be handled are effectiveness of security (Independent variable) and potential threats of terrorism (dependent Variable).

Independent variable is the one which the researcher will manipulate to see if it makes the dependent variable change. It is the one which is believed to affect the dependent Variable (DV) while the dependent variable is the one the researcher measures in order to establish the change or effect created on it. The researcher tries to establish the relationship between the two variables in the study. For example whether reduced threats of terrorism in the country depends on how the effectiveness of security agencies is handled or manipulated. The Independent variable (IV) influences the dependent variable (DV) as it is the presumed cause of the variations in the dependent variable. The study intended to fill some gaps which may be the cause of potential threats of terrorism in the country which include among others: Porous borders, weak immigration laws, Islamic radicalization of the youth, and laxity by security officers, corruption, and inadequate coordination among security agencies, ignorance of the public about security matters and poor detection of crimes among others. All these would entail a wider range of interventions to realize positive changes that the country would be interested in. Positive changes or results will be felt through reduced threats of terrorism in Uganda, improved protection of lives and property by security agencies, improved confidence among the public on security effectiveness, secure businesses of the business community, reduced terrorism activities in the country, freedom of movement by the public and reduced human rights abuses among others. The above conditions can only be realized when certain conditions have been met. For instance strengthening international relations through cross border cooperation's among all stakeholders from neighboring countries on security matters; constant vigilance by security agencies in detection of crime, sensitization of the public, training of security agencies with new skills to counter terrorist activities; new policies on immigrants; dealing with issues of corruption, creating more opportunities for jobs for the youth, protection of human rights; enhancing of early

warning and operational intelligence. However, challenges to realize the above may be hampered by unwanted influence which the researcher may term as extraneous variable which if not controlled may affect the results of the study. These include among others, political interference, human rights issues, drug use. There are also other challenges such as inadequate funding to security agencies, human resource challenges among others.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

In this chapter an overview of related literature to the topic was undertaken to clarify the study concepts. It looks at the changing patterns of terrorism activities, modern forms of terrorism, their modus operandi, sources of funding and it cites some recorded incidents of terrorism world over. It highlights the roles played by states departments of security as well as the roles of other stakeholders involved in the fight against terrorism globally, regionally and nationally. The chapter also looks at gaps and challenges faced by security agencies and other stakeholders in the execution of their mandates.

2.1 Perspectives of Terrorism

Rapoport (2004) identifies four waves of terrorism namely the Anarchist wave, the anti- colonial wave, new left wave and the Religious wave.

He ties the Anarchist motivation to the failure of democratic reforms agendas across Europe during the 19th and 20th centuries. He argues that anarchist attempted to abolish Government and their fundamental tactics were of individual terrorism and were primarily characterized by assassination of key Government officials and this wave which began in Russia in the 1880s extended to the Balkans, Asia, as well as Europe.

The anti-colonial wave of the 1920s was characterized by national self-determination in opposition to the oppressive yoke of colonialism. For example, the Irish republican rebellion of 1919 against the English in Northern Ireland occupation and terrorist attacks directed against the police, soldiers, judges, and Government officials as explained by Moten (2010).

The new left wave contended against the imperialism of the west and thus was characterized by nationalism and radicalism, it employed tactics such as hostage taking, kidnapping, and assassinations, groups such as the Italian red Brigade, the west Germany red army faction (RAF) in 1960`s and 1970`s and the Japanese Red army were prominent examples during this wave.

According to Moten (2010), Islam is at the heart of this wave. What characterized this wave is fundamentalism, where by brutal violence, slaughter of the so called infidels and violation of human rights by those who regard themselves as true believers (Schmidt, 2004), explains that

Iranian Revolution of 1979 is arguably a primary precipitant factor of modern religious fundamentalism in an effort to export its Islamic revolution throughout Middle East.

2.2 Changing Patterns of Terrorist Activity

Forms of terrorism have emerged in recent years which differ in important respects from what might be called “traditional” terrorism. The goal of terrorism is often sustained opposition to active economic, social, political, or cultural systems. Terrorism has since acquired more dimensions that are global as the events of September 11, 2001 and other subsequent attacks globally have shown. Their attacks often aim to kill as many civilians as possible as accentuated by a trend that began in the 1980’s. Thus, places where people gather in large numbers such as shopping malls, railways stations, football grounds, markets, large buildings have become natural targets. Moreover, the more recent form of terrorism also tries to take advantage of modern society’s reliance on critical Infrastructures such as energy, water, transport, healthcare, financial services and Information systems. Destruction or at least lengthy disruption of such infrastructures may entail a heavy human and economic cost hence the protection of such places and vital systems should become a priority task for governments and for the operators of critically important facilities.

Richard (2008) summarized terrorism as “global concern”. In reality, terrorism is on the rapid increase and it has proved to be one of the deadly human threats in the present time as indicated by the Global Terrorism Index (2000-2014).

Boaz et al (2010) state that “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” it has become not only a cliché but also one of the most difficult obstacles to cope with. This is because what others think is terrorism may not necessarily be terrorism to others. The former president of Libya, the late Colonel Mohammad Gaddafi called terrorist Acts heroic acts. Experts assert that certain terrorist acts are due to some unresolved local issues. In the researchers’ opinion, this changing pattern of terrorism activities should be superseded by many security reforms within the security stakeholders to counter them, which is why the study was focused on assessing the roles that different security agencies are doing to counter these challenges.

2.3 Modern forms of Terrorism

Ganor (2009) elaborated two schools of thought explaining the phenomenon of modern terrorism which have emerged out of the collection of academic works within the discipline. This can be

explained by the “psychological-sociological” school of thought and the “political-rational” school of thought. Both schools maintain that terrorism seeks to achieve political goals by instilling fear and anxiety among the target population, but each stresses a different aspect of the explanation. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) report (2016) indicated that the modern terrorists like Boko Haram are more confident due to their modern and sophisticated weapons which tend to overpower the state’s military strength.

Laqueur (1999) suggests, “There has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution, in the character of terrorism.” He compares old terrorism with new terrorism where old terrorism is terrorism that strikes only selected targets while new terrorism is terrorism that is indiscriminate and causes as many casualties as possible. Another major feature according to Laqueur, is the increasing readiness to use extreme indiscriminate violence.

Laqueur (1999) further argues that its operation is not clearly defined but aims at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population.” He added that, terrorism has changed because of a paradigm shift. According to him, a paradigm is a pattern, worldview, or model that is logically established to represent a concept. A paradigm is also a way of interpreting the world that has been accepted by a group of people and that can be useful for politicians and thinkers to design policy agendas. When a paradigm changes, the whole group experiences a paradigm shift. Following the ongoing destructions caused by Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram of Nigeria, ISIL in Syria plus many other terrorist organizations across the world, the conclusion can easily be drawn that terrorism of the present time is more interested in causing harm to the innocent population with the aim of annoying those in authority but not aiming at taking political power.

What is significant is that; people in authority must continue working together in agreement with the humanitarian reality. Nathan (2006) quoted Abraham Lincoln “*when we get to know the human being as fellow human, it is much harder to hate them*” and the reverse is equally true. This means that terrorism can only be minimized when we all appreciate the human coexistence. It is unfortunate however that the racial prejudice has taken center stage in inter human relationship hence jeopardizing peaceful coexistence. In fact, the ideal of liberty, fraternity, and respect for human rights should be embraced by all races.

2.4 Current Methods of Terrorist operations

In the present days, terrorists have adopted so many methods of operations and these can be confirmed by what happened on 9th 11, 2001 US bombings, Kampala twin bombing in 2010, Westgate Mall in Nairobi (2013), Garissa University in northern Kenya in 2015 and in many places across the world where different tactics have been employed by the terrorists.

Fassed (2001) explained twelve different major tactics which are commonly employed by terrorists and these include Grenade attacks in cafes, improvised explosive devices (IEDS) with high explosive charges placed in crowded places, the use of explosive ordinance devices (EODS), assassination of government officials, taking of hostages to put pressure on the government, blowing up of government offices and prominent figures, booby-traps and the use of vehicles parked alongside buildings loaded with explosives, letter-bombs sent to politicians, murder of hostages as a reprisal for government actions, kidnappings, drive by shootings, armed assaults and the use of suicide vests by individuals. Furthermore, one should not forget to mention abduction as one of the methods commonly employed by the modern terrorist organizations. In the recent past, Boko Haram abducted 219 Chibok school girls and took them to unknown location as reported by the BBC focus on Africa (May 12th 2014).

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), one of the notorious Christian terror organizations has been abducting children in many areas where they operate. UN report (2012) stated that about 591 were abducted by this group between (2009- 2011) alone. But in the case of Kampala twin bombings, it was unique in such a manner that both suicide bombing and the use of improvised explosive devices were used as was evidenced by the discovery of a human head, suicide vest and undetonated homemade bomb at the scene. This means that combinations of tactics were used by the terrorists to execute their mission. This incidence caught the security agencies off guard as the terrorists were able to enter both premises without being noticed and were even able to plant the bombs unchallenged. The researcher believes that lack of proper access control and vigilance by security at both scenes of crime was the main contributing factor to the gap that the terrorists exploited to enable them to accomplish their mission. As a result of the above, security in Uganda has been restructured by creating different squadrons to handle different aspects for example the Joint Anti-terrorism task force (JATT) has been strengthened by creating units such as the bomb squad, Sniffer dogs, marine units to patrol waters, community policing units of the police, compulsory registration of SIM cards, crime intelligence units, Joint intelligence

committees, introduction of surveillance drones, training of specialized units in fighting urban terrorism among others.

However, in spite of these forms, there remain a number of challenges to be addressed, for example the challenge of the porous borders where terrorists can enter and get out at will. There is also a challenges of some Islamic religious groups which come into the country disguised as charity organizations setting mosques, schools which in turn are used as recruitment and training grounds for innocent and vulnerable youth for terrorist activities, a case in point are the Madarasa schools which were discovered in Ssesse islands in 2014 and were being used to recruit for ADF in the DRC. There is also a challenge of funding for security agencies to train, purchase equipment for detection of terrorist crime in the country, Challenge of many unemployed youth who can easily be lured to get involved in terrorist activities for economic survival among many others.

2.5 Notable terrorist attacks

Some of the notable terrorist attacks are mentioned below;

- a) On September 11th 2001, nineteen men affiliated with Al-Qaeda militant group hijacked four commercial passenger jets all bound for California, crashing two of them into the world trade centre in New York City, the third into the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia and the fourth into an open field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. As a result, more than 3000 people were killed and more than 6000 others injured. The attacks were later blamed to lack of proper coordination by the intelligence agencies of the US in sharing intelligence information before the attacks which the researcher believes was a security a gap.

This later led the US government to launch war on terror and invaded Afghanistan on October 7th 2001 to depose the Taliban who had harbored Al-Qaeda terrorists. The US enacted the patriot Act on October 26th 2001 that expanded the powers of US law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Many countries later followed with similar Legislation such as the Anti-Terrorist Act 2002 of Uganda to suppress acts of terrorism and to provide punishment for those who plan, instigate, support, finance or executive acts of terrorism. Under the Obama Administration 2008-2016 the US changed tactics moving away from ground combat with large numbers of troops to the use of drones and Special Forces. This campaign helped eliminate much of Al-Qaeda's most senior members

including a strike by a team of six Navy seals that resulted in the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011.

- b) The 2008 Mumbai attacks where more than ten coordinated shootings and bombing attacks across Mumbai, India's largest City by Lashkar-e-Taiban, a Pakistani Islamist terrorist Organization with ties to ISI Pakistan's secret services.
- c) October 12, 2000, suicide attack on USS Cole in Yemen port of Aden, where 17 American sailors were killed 39 injured.
- d) Dec 13 2001 suicide attack on Indian parliament in New Delhi by Pakistan based Islamist terrorist Organization Jaish – E -Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba, causing anarchy in the country 7 were killed and 12 injured.
- e) Feb 14 2005 Assassination of Rafic Hariri the former Prime minister of Lebanon, 22 people killed when a 1,000 kg of TNT high explosive exploded near his motorcade in Beirut.
- f) Feb. 10 2016 more than 70 killed in a double suicide attack on a camp for IDP in Dikwa Nigeria, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack, though they have now been forced out of North Africa.
- g) On the evening of 14 July 2016, a 19 tonne cargo truck was deliberately driven into crowds of people celebrating Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, France, resulting in the deaths of 86 people and the injury of 458 others.
- h) On June 8th 2017, there was a dual attack on the parliament's buildings and Ayatollah Khomeini's tombs in the Iranian capital Tehran which left many dead and several others injured. The attack on the parliaments specifically left many Iranians wondering how four armed men could enter the parliaments where tight security has always been in place.
- i) Monday 22nd may 2017; a terrorist attack took place at Arianna Grande concert at the city of Manchester in the UK killing 22 people and injuring over 59 others. In a message posted on line the Islamic state claimed responsibility for the attack. It was one of the deadliest attack to hit the UK since the July, 7, 2005 London Bombing.

There was yet a deadly terrorist attack carried out on the Northern army base in Afghanistan by the Taliban fighters that killed over 100 people. The uniformed attackers entered the base in vehicles and opened fire which was followed by explosions at one of the gates (CNN, 2017).

2.6 Sources of Terrorism funding

Terrorists have somehow managed to cause mayhem across the globe, simply because they are capable of fundraising and transfer money and other materials that they normally use to accomplish their heinous acts. Terrorists have been able to mobilize support from individuals, companies and through other illegal dealings, for example, drug trafficking, hijacking ships, and demanding for ransom. The Taliban in Afghanistan were exporting drugs such as cocaine to finance their activities, the Al Shabaab in Somalia used piracy in the seas. This therefore, has prompted several International, Regional and National bodies to forge a way forward in an attempt to discourage terrorism financing channels.

Kaplan (2006) a terrorism expert, notes that donations from the wealthy individuals is one of the sources of terrorist funding, he said that for the last five years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia were most important sources of funding to Al-Qaeda. Collins (2006) confirmed that there are tens of thousands in the Islamic world who are fully committed in supporting terrorist activities.

Napoleon (2016) noticed illegal activities like transactions in smuggled goods and drug trafficking as another major source of terrorism financing across the world. This clearly shows how terrorists are spending sleeplessness nights to do all what it takes to raise funds to support their ill actions.

Kaplan (2006) further emphasized that, many terrorist organizations attempt to operate legitimate businesses which generate their own profits and the same profits can be used as a front for laundering. He further said, ties to terrorism have been found amid the trade of livestock, fish, and leather. New York Times (2001) reported that Osama bin Laden owned and operated a string of honey shops throughout the Middle East and Pakistan where he used to generate money and the same avenues were used to conceal shipments of money and weapons.

2.7 Role played by different security organs in fighting against terrorism at the international level.

During the panel discussion on counter terrorism strategies: challenges and perspectives on June 12th, 2015, the former president of Mauritania H.E. Elyould Mohammed Vallforum explained that as early as 1937, the league of Nations adopted a convention condemning Terrorism and its fighters which allowed member states in the 1960's to take part in the negotiations relating to the conventions on counter Terrorism. Since 1963 and 1999 respectively, the International

Community was able to put in place 19 texts of International Law to combat terrorism acts. The United Nations General assembly for example adopted several International conventions against terrorism together with its additional protocols. This legal basis constitutes a solid and appropriate frame work to combat acts of terrorism globally. These texts also recommend that states adopt national laws in accordance with International jurisdictions. The work of the International summit on the fight against Terrorism of 2005 led the UN General assembly against terrorism on July 8, 2006. This strategy entails an action plan that aims to counteract the development of conditions that favor terrorism and to take measures to strengthen state capacities, reinforce the UN's role and respect of Human rights in the fight against terrorism.

In addition, the G. 8 (group of eight nations), the EU, NATO, the organization of American states as well as the Arab league have been acting in trying to determine the causes of extremism, identifying its roots and counteract its negative effects. For example these have led several summits in the past years to examine topics linked to terrorism and the causes of its expansion in the world, risks linked to weapons of mass destruction, social problems, regional conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. An action plan was put in place for the protection of nuclear resources and infrastructure, technical information, the reinforcement of financial contributions, the fight against poverty and the support to health programs in the poorest countries. In Addition, the European Union (EU) adopted an action plan to fight terrorism through several measures directed at various sectors; legal cooperation, cooperation between different security agencies, security of transportation means, border controls, document security, the fights against covert financing (money laundering), political dialogue, external relations, defense against Biological and nuclear weapons.

The EU has also taken additional measures, such as the reinforcement of their strategic assets, at the national, regional and international levels with the aim to protect the population, tracking down terrorists and to prevent radicalization and enrollment of young people. The Europeans border agency is working to coordinate the cooperation to limit illegal Immigration. In this regard, it is planned that Immigrants will be monitored at border controls with in the E.U. North American Trade Organization (NATO) has already initiated a series of special measures in relation to counter terrorism in an effort to develop performing technology to be able to respond to terrorist threats such as the protection of allied forces against attacks, to launch rockets, to protect harbors, sea patrols, as well as other measures.

NATO's work on counter terrorism focuses on increasing awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond and enhancing engagement with partner states and other International actors. For example, NATO invoked its collective defense clause (Art. 5) for the first time in response to the Terrorist attack of Sept 11, 2001. On the U.S, NATO is creating a new regional Hub for the south, based at NATO's Joint Force Command in Naples.

NATO also provides support to the coalition to defeat ISIL with surveillance Air craft and by the use of its advanced airborne warning & control system (AWACS) among other support provided. The new structures introduced such as the NATO-Russia permanent council and the NATO Ukraine charter are considered to be key initiatives in the fight against Terrorism at the International level. In the panel discussion mentioned in the first paragraph, it was reported that the counter terrorism commission of the organization of American states held a special meeting in New York in 2003 during which all the regional organizations vowed to exchange information to fight terrorism. The UN Security Council took a strong action against terrorism by approving the Security Council resolution 1373 of 2001 which had sweeping section measures by imposing worldwide financial solutions, travel restrictions as well as military measures on terrorists and their supporters worldwide. These sections required every country in the world to cooperate by freezing financial assets suspected to be owned by terrorists' organizations/groups, and to prevent the use of their territories as terrorists' bases for planning attacks.

The resolution also required cooperating states to prevent the movement of terrorists by means of effective border controls and restrictions on the issuance of travel documents. These interventions have had a significant role in countering terrorism activities worldwide. However on the other hand, Lopec, (2002) noted that it has caused divisions among some states whereby those with radical views opposing it by continuing to sponsor terrorist organizations which is a challenge to the fight against terrorism.

The Arab League on the other hand is acting strongly against terrorism, extremism and fanaticism. In this regard the Arab convention against terrorism was adopted in 1998, thus updating cooperation among Arab states on counter terrorism. These measures reinforce on the fight against terrorist crimes, on awareness raising actions, cooperation with the Civil Air Force Organizations, INTERPOL, (International Police), the International Maritime Organization, the United Nations Refugee Agency among others.

These regional and International efforts in the researcher's opinion are good, but are still insufficient in countering terrorism and extremism if there is no International Cooperation which is in line with a consequent political will. There should also be a resolute action to solve conflicts and civil wars in a peaceful way, such as through mediation, mutual agreement and justice, the prohibition of activities of communication and support of extremism, strengthening International Cooperation on Information exchange, blocking International financial sources among others. The Carrot and stick policy introduced by the US and the UN by lifting of sanctions as well as offering economic assistance to specific Nations to encourage them to cooperate in fighting terrorism, and at the same time applying targeted financial sanctions against those Individual organizations and states associated with terrorist activities to the fight against terrorism should be adopted by all states.

2.7.1 The United Nation's Global Counter Terrorism Strategy

The United Nations General Assembly on 8 September 2006 adopted the global counter terrorism strategy to counter terrorism where all member states agreed to a common strategic and operational approach to fight Terrorism. A wide range of measures were adopted which included: strengthening states capacity to counter Terrorist threats and to better coordinating UN systems to counter terrorism activities. The General Assembly has since been reviewing the strategy every two years hence making it a living document. The global counter terrorism strategy in the form of a resolution and an annexed plan of action (A/RES/60/288 is composed of 4 pillars namely: To address the conditions conducive to the spread of Terrorism, measures to prevent and combat Terrorism, measures to build state's capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, measures to ensure respect of Human Rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basic for the fight against Terrorism.

The United Nations counter terrorism office was established through the adoption of the General Assembly resolution 71/291 on June 2017 with the following 5 main functions; to provide leadership on the General Assembly counter terrorism mandates, to strengthen mandates, to enhance coordination, to strengthen delivery of UN CT counter terrorism capacity building assistance to member states, to improve visibility, advancing and resource mobilization for Un CT efforts and to ensure that due priority is given to CT across the Un system and that the impact work on preventing violent extremism is firmly rooted in the strategy. Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 in the US, many Islamist Inspired terrorist plots against the US have been foiled by the

vigilance of the security agencies, save for a few individual Terrorist incidents which have claimed some lives in different states of the US.

The US has come a long way in terms of its richness to prevent and combat acts of terrorism. Large investments in the department of Homeland security (DHS), the FBI, the Intelligence Community state and local partners and other government agencies have increased the U.S ability to prevent terrorism before it occurs. Through diplomacy, the US department of state promotes International Counter terrorism cooperation for both her interests as well as those of her partners by enhancing the capabilities of her allies to self-sustaining in the fight against terrorist threats and networks so as to degrade their capabilities (U.S Department of State, 2001)

According to Erdman (2002), the United States of America (USA) through NATO has made great strides in transforming its military capabilities to make the alliance more expeditionary and deployable against Global terror threats. This is evidenced by its contribution in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan through its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its maritime terrorism monitoring presence in the Mediterranean Sea, among other engagements.

However, despite all these investments and improvements, the reality of the threat is still as present as ever, especially from Islamic state of Iraq (ISIS)/ISIL or Daesh as well as home grown terrorism. An example is the Las Vegas shooting of October 1st 2017 in Nevada, USA where 58 people were shot dead and over 500 injured by a wealthy retired accountant “Stephen Paddock,” (64 years) who was found in his possession 47 guns with thousands of ammunition. He was able to check into the hotel with 10 bags and booked into 32nd floor of the Mandalay bay hotel from where he shot at the crowd through his hotel window. This was during the country music concert which was attended by estimated 22000 strong audiences. He later shot himself dead before the security got to him. This incident left the following questions in the minds of many people; (1) why didn't the security of the hotel screen the 10 bags? (2) How strong are the gun laws in the US? The challenge which was observed is that licensed gun dealers who handle about 60% gun sales do it with few restrictions within the laws of the Federal states; therefore gun control by law enforcement is difficult hence undermining the effectiveness of the security stakeholders to fight crimes in general.

According to Erdman (2002), terrorism in the US was not regarded as a major focus in the 1980's through the 1990s, but it was considered just as an issue that occasionally made its way

onto newspaper front pages. It was regarded as a secondary policy issue, but the terrible events of Sept 11, 2001 changed that view. It altered the way America viewed the world, the nature of the terrorist threat and the way government must respond to fulfill its most basic of all responsibilities of protecting the lives and liberties of all its citizens. Now the fight against Terrorism is top most in the US Domestic and Foreign policies. It has been rallying unprecedented global coalition to fight terrorism on all fronts: Diplomatic, military, Intelligence, Law enforcement, immigration among many other strategies.

The decision by the pentagon to create a separate Africa command based in Djibouti (horn of Africa) is the clearest indication that the US military and other branches of the US government view other regions such as the sub-Saharan Africa as a growing Islamic terrorist threat. This decision was driven in the main by the realization that the fragmentation nature of the US military intelligence gathering and regional security training efforts were failing to meet a growing threat posed by the expanding networks in east and South Africa, most especially the strong presence of radical Islamic groups in Somalia and the growing presence of Iranian backed groups tied to Hezbollah and at times cooperating with Al-Qaida.

2.7.2 Researcher's Comment on the above reviewed literature

The fight against terrorism is not a job which can be undertaken by a single entity, it requires team work and input from a wide range of national and international organizations including law enforcement agents, military, intelligence, the financial sector, the diplomatic service and others. The key to success is these organizations cooperation and coordination. Another prerequisite for success is good governance which is central to the effective administration of state resources, the rule of law, the creation of a functioning private sector and the development of a strong civil society. Only if such structures are in place can the war against terrorism which is fuelled mostly by dissatisfaction and ignorance be won. The Unanimous adoption of the Un S.C Res. 1373 within days of the 9/11 attacks placed demand and binding obligations on all nations into the fight against terrorism with its clear language. This important resolution helped establish the fundamental International norms in this struggle that all nations must not only combat terrorism, but also cooperate with other nations counter terrorism efforts.

According to Erdman, (2002) the United Kingdom (UK) has established a cabinet office briefing room (COBRA) which is highly effective and able to take the necessary decisions to mitigate terrorist threats. This body cuts across red tape and has reduced time to action significantly

making it probably the most effective crisis management organization active in counter terrorism today. It is backed by a well-functioning domestic and international intelligence service, a respected diplomatic service, experienced police and well trained Special Forces on standby at all times.

Erdman,(2002) further noted that COBRA is a decision making authority which receives intelligence, interprets the Intelligence and issues instructions to the relevant authorities such as the police, the armed forces, and the intelligence services among others. It does not micro manage the event but depends on others to act as it instructs. It depends upon having a range of well trained and loyal persons from various organizations who will carry out its decisions. Britain also has a counter terrorism policy built on four pillars; to prevent terrorism by addressing radicalization and recruitment, to disrupt terrorist plans and activities as well as their capacities, making UK targets at home and abroad more secure and to prepare for attacks by building the capacity to respond to them quickly. This policy is implemented by making embassies more secure and issuing travel advisories to British citizens in areas where there is perceived threat and strict travel guidelines to British officials. However, its ironical that in spite of this measures, Britain has continued to experience some nasty terrorism acts, examples being the underground train attacks and a bus attack in 2005 which killed 52 people in London and then again the recent Manchester attack of 2017 among other individual actors incidents.

UK and the U.S also have a counter terrorism strategies in Africa with the main focus to build the capacity of friendly African states to help in the effort. They have extended what they were doing in South Asia and the Middle East to Africa on the grounds that large parts of the continent were a potential theater for terrorist activities. The fear being that if terrorist activities are not checked, terrorist groups would continue to exploit Africa's weak and failing states such as Somalia, South Sudan, the Sahara among others. The US as stated earlier has established a joint task force in Djibouti to monitor the red sea and the horn of Africa for terrorist activity. 2006 saw the creation of the US military Command (AFRICOM) with the responsibility for overseeing US defense policy in Africa. Significantly, this was the same year which saw the US launch their first operations in African (Somalia) using the Ethiopian Army to fight the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) with full Diplomatic and Political cover from the UN. The US continues to work with countries such as Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad on the Implementation of the Pan Sahel Initiative, a programme designed to assist those nations in protecting their borders.

The British Government on the other hand has passed some of the most far reaching legislation in the world, giving law enforcement agencies wide spread powers to monitor internet and phone traffic and having access to metadata of online communication without a warrant, but not to the content of Individuals. The challenge through is that there are few restrictions on the mass collection of the telephone and internet data. There are also debates about balancing civil liberties and security whereby citizens claim that new laws would infringe on people's liberties, the same dilemma is experienced in the US, where president Donald Trump's efforts to restrict Immigration from predominantly Muslim countries was blocked by courts of law. The key challenge that Congress faces with transportation security is balancing the desire for increasing more effectively rail passenger security with the efficient functioning of transit systems, and the potential costs and damages of an attack.

According to the US, (2016) congressional Research Service Report (CRS) it acknowledged that it is impractical to attempt to screen all train and bus passengers like airports do with fliers, and as a result, transit security tends to emphasize managing the consequences of an attack, instead of preventing one. The CRS goes ahead to list a number of steps that can be taken to mitigate the risk as; (a) vulnerability assessment (b) emergency planning (c) emergency response training and drilling of transit personnel i.e. police, fire and media personnel (d) increasing the number of transit security personnel (e) installing video surveillance equipment in vehicles and stations (f) conducting random inspections of Baggage, platforms & trains.

An increased law enforcement presence at locations would be adopted as a deterrent to crime and terrorism but experts argue that it is only possible if they are deployed strategically. It's inherently a deterrent if it is properly used and if it has an element of unpredictability. If security agencies can use intelligence and threat assessment to determine where the danger is greatest on any given day and direct resources there, it would make it harder for suspects to anticipate and adapt. It becomes like a moving goal post which is hard to be targeted.

Mrs. Theresa May the Prime Minister of Britain in May 2016 (BBC News, 2016) acknowledged the challenge of most communities in the U.K not being good at policing themselves which challenge the researcher believes cuts across the globe. On a positive note though, Peter, R. Neumann, a professor of security studies at King's College London and Director of the international centre for the study of radicalization stated that technology companies are much more responsive now to government requests to shut down accounts or videos expressing

extremist views than were some years before. He also adds that in terms of surveillance power, Britain is already better equipped than any other European country. But another challenge is that this move has pushed extremists to use encrypted channels of communication like telegram. Mrs. Theresa May's successor as home secretary Amber Rudd suggested that technology companies could do so much more to restrict extremism on-line; social media giants should limit end-to-end encryption which many extremists use to plot attacks.

Mrs. May herself has called for democratic governments to demand for greater controls over how social media services such as whatsapp and facebook could be used by attackers to spread extremist messages online as well as how they use social media to promote their views to a global digital audience. These demands however, still have raised serious concerns from some telecom companies who claim that the new demand would infringe on peoples liberties.

Matters where made worse especially after the Manchester terrorist attack in 2017 where Mrs. May and other British law makers said that they would revisit plans to force technology companies to open their encrypted message services to the country's intelligence agencies allowing them to monitor messages sent by people suspected of planning attacks. In recent years, technology companies have repeatedly said that they were willing to work with law enforcement to crack down on extremists using their services but they added that weakening encryption could also allow for the illegal collection of personal information by domestic or foreign intelligence services.

According to Jeremy, (2017) France has long been on the bleeding edge of international terrorism in the last 20 years. It has suffered repeated waves of both International and domestic terrorism as a result it has developed largely by costly trial and error, a fairly effective system for fighting terrorism at home which is uniquely tailored to Frances's particular threats, capacities and civic culture. They have had to put in place centralized and special judicial process, a strong, trusted relationship between Judicial and Intelligence organizations and the interaction between counter terrorism efforts at home and abroad. France in November 2017 ended its state of emergency, but terrorist threats remain and fears of new terror attacks persist especially from Iraq and Syrian extremists. The government has resolved to detect signs of extremism in their early stages. French Prime Minister Eduard Philippe has proposed 60 measures that reflect the goal of tackling the radical threat in a serious and comprehensive manner. (Jeremy, 2017)

Despite these measures, some sides have criticized the plan for failing to take into consideration the economic and development aspects of marginalized regions which are predominantly made up of migrants and are fertile ground for radicalization to take hold. One of the proposals is that before combating terrorism, its signs should be detected at an early stage by addressing the emergence of these signs at schools on pre-school, elementary and secondary levels. Government wants schools to adhere to secularism, provide specialized academic inspectors and put more emphasis into exchange of information with security agencies.

2.7.3 Terrorism in Africa in General

Africa has not been immune from terrorism, battling with it in the Sahel, Horn of Africa, Nigeria, and other countries. Africa as a continent experienced significant levels of terrorist activities in 2014 as clearly presented by Chapter two of country reports on terrorism (2014). Reports showed that, in the horn of Africa, Somalia based terrorist group Al-Shabaab (youth) remained the primary terrorist threat. Even though Al-Shabaab continues to cause havoc in Somalia and neighboring countries, the report pointed out that through the African Mission in Somalia, (AMISOM) forces have been able to supplant activities of Terrorism inside Somalia. Important to note is that when Al Shabaab activities increased in Somalia, the groups expanded its activities into Kenya and Uganda in retaliation for Kenyan and Ugandan forces intervention in Somalia. To expand its geographic Scope of operations, Al-Shabaab has gone an extra mile to try to recruit Somali expatriates from western countries including (the United States, Canada, UK, Sweden and The Netherlands) as well as hardened fighters from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has also openly aligned itself with al-Qaeda in an attempt to gather more support.

The targets of Al-Shabaab are quite varied some of which include; private citizens and properties, general government, police, businesses, diplomatic entities, journalists and many others. In an attempt to gain control of territory in Somalia, they have attacked military targets of various nations including Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia itself, turkey, Burundi and Uganda. The group's most lethal attacks are characterized by armed assaults, mass causality bombings, use of suicide bombers who use suicide vests and belts, kidnappings and the use of car bombs and sniper fire. Although AMISOM forces have tried to register some gains, in one way or the other they still face some challenges. According to the Daily Nation of 21 Feb. 2016, the European Union revealed that it was reducing its budget to the mission in Somalia because of financial constraints. This will absolutely pose a big challenge in an attempt to wipe out Al-Shabaab from the horn of African soil. Uganda has already announced that it will gradually pull out its troops

from Somalia beginning from the late 2017. In addition, other countries are likely to follow suit which if effected may create a big gap to the security of the Somali government and its neighboring states. In addition, as stated by Shinn (2013), the Horn of Africa has been one of the most conflicted parts of Africa during the last 50 years. Although there have been long-standing disputes in places like Angola, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo, no other region on the continent has had as many conflicts for such a long span of time. Shinn (2013), further mentioned the root causes of terrorism being numerous and sometimes complex. They include ethnic, language and cultural differences, arbitrary boundaries, religion, ideology, competition for scarce resources including pasturage and water, unequal sharing of resources controlled by the state, and the sheer desire for power among others.

2.8 Role played by security organs at the regional level

Continental efforts in preventing and combating Terrorism have a long history.

In 1992, the Organization of African Union (OAU) adopted a resolution on the strengthening of cooperation and coordination among African states in which the Union pledged to fight the phenomenon of extremism and terrorism. On June 1994, at its 30th ordinary session held in Tunisia the OAU adopted the declaration on the code of conduct for Inter-African Relations in which it rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism, whether under the pretext of sectarianism, tribalism, ethnicity or religion. It also condemned all activities of terrorism and expressed its resolve to enhance cooperation to combat such acts. These efforts culminated into the July 1999 Organization of African Unity (OAU) convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism adopted by the 35th ordinary session of the OAU summit held in Algiers, Algeria. The convention required that states parties criminalize terrorist acts under their national laws as defined in the convention. It defines areas of cooperation among states, establishes state jurisdictions over terrorist acts and provides a legal frame work for extradition as well as extra territorial investigations and mutual legal assistance. The African Union (AU) plan of action on the prevention and combating of Terrorism was adopted in September 2002. The plan adopted practical counter terrorism measures that substantially address Africa's security challenges.

As part of the implementation of the 2002 plan of action, the African Centre for study and research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in 2004 in Algiers to serve as a structure for centralizing information studies and analyses on terrorism and terrorist groups and to develop counter terrorism capacity building programmes. The centre plays a major role in guiding the

AU's. Counter terrorism efforts and works in collaboration with a number of regional and international partners to ensure coherent and coordinated counter terrorism efforts in the continent. African union has designated Algiers as the location of an African Union counter terrorism centre. The July 2010 AU assembly in Kampala underscored the need for renewed efforts and increased mobilization of support in the fight against terrorism. Several nations have so far formed National CT centres, Uganda being one of them.

2.8.1 An Overview of Terrorism in West Africa

West Africa has had its fair share of terrorism activities as well when compared to other parts of the world with Boko Haram in Nigeria and neighboring states posing the greatest humanitarian threats. In his publication titled "Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa," Busher (2014) noted that, in spite of spirited efforts made by African governments to fight terrorism, most prominent groups have thrived, with Boko Haram's escalating assaults on civilians and military installations in Northern Nigeria and beyond providing clear evidence.

Global Terrorism Index report (2014), narrowed down the groups to Taliban, Boko Haram, ISIS and Al-Qaeda as the four terrorist groups responsible for the most destructive acts in the present time in African continent. The above assertion was also confirmed by Schmitt et al (2011) who also added that the three militant organizations including Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel region of North Africa and Boko Haram in northern Nigeria are the ones responsible for the deadly attacks due to their advanced methods of carrying out their operations.

Abrahms (2008) an expert on terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa described Morocco as "*a natural candidate*" after clearly studying the situations that could easily lead to the immediate expansion of terrorism in Morocco. Global Terrorism Index (2014) report identifies 13 countries with a high risk potential of terrorism activity including: Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote D' Ivory, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel, Mali, Mexico, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Uganda. These nations either have ongoing conflicts or notable social and economic setbacks, for example the 12th November 2015 UN report on the UN integrated strategy for the Sahel paints a grim picture noting that terrorist groups had intensified asymmetric attacks in the north and had even moved southwards with the attacks in the center including in the Malian capital, Bamako and the border with Burkina Faso, Mauritania as well as in the south at the border region with Cote- divoire.

According to FFI (2004) report on the financing of Jihad Terrorism cells in Europe, it is important to note that there are multiple factors which can easily cause the rapid expansion of terrorism activities which can as well be settled through provision of adequate responses to the political questions of a particular nation like political discontent, ideological rivalries, governance issues, cessation tendencies, needs for self-determination, among others.

2.8.2 The New Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) strategy in Western Africa

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a new phase in the fight against Terrorism on 27th February, 2013 where the West African leaders vowed to leave no stone unturned as far as fighting terrorism is concerned. This vow was embodied in the political Declaration on a common position against terrorism which included a counter terrorism strategy and implementation plan. For example, member states unequivocally condemned terrorism and its related offences such as incitement to and financing of terrorism. The declaration also establishes the principle that a terrorist attack in one member state constitutes an attack on all.

The strategy is the result of an inclusive process that began in 2009 and has involved national, regional and international experts, civil society and media organizations. The principal purpose of the declaration and strategy is to prevent and eradicate terrorism and its related criminal acts in West Africa, with a view to creating conditions conducive to sound economic development and ensuring the wellbeing of all ECOWAS citizens. The plan also seeks to give effect to regional, continental and international counter terrorism instruments and to provide a common operational framework of action.

According to Ewi (2013) the recent intensification of terrorist attacks in the region, particularly following the escalation of the Niger Delta conflict in 2006 and the resurgence of Boko Haran in 2009 as well as the occupation of Northern Mali by terrorist groups in 2012 alarmed not only the west African states but also the broader international community. Key lessons learnt by these contemporary manifestations of terrorism has been their transnational nature, whereby an attack may be planned in country A and executed in country B and the materials for the attack coming from country(s) CD etc. The challenge therefore is whether the declaration of ECOWAS strategy can solve the complicated problem of terrorism in West Africa which is often Inter-twined with transnational criminality such as drug trafficking, and other related crimes. The other challenge could be the lack of political will, resources:- Human, financial and material which may not be

adequate as well as the perennial problems of competing priorities between CT and other pressing needs.

2.9 Role played by security agencies at the Individual state level

Mali for example has taken consistent steps in combating Terrorism and has particularly been responsive on terrorist financing issues by regularly distributing terrorist finance watch lists to the banking system. It has also been receptive to the ideas of strengthening its borders and is also the key recipient of the pan-Sahel initiative, which is primarily focused on common border security issues with Chad, Niger and Mauritania.

Nigeria cooperates with countries such as the US and others in tracking and freezing terrorist assets. The government has often shared information on the rise of radical Islam in Nigeria which is home to Africa's largest Muslim population.

Maxim Worcester -A Berlin based British security consultant and former managing director control Risks Deutschland (GMBH) stated that; much of the sub-continent has a strong traditional Islamic presence and a mosaic of societal structures. These factors combine to present a set of challenges for intelligence gathering and long term policy setting. Add to these the number of failed and failing states in the region, many of which are experiencing civil wars like Somalia, South Sudan, Central African Republic coupled with the various agendas which the terrorist organizations are pursuing and you have a highly complex and volatile situation.

Somalia very clearly illustrates the problems Africa is facing in the fight against terrorism. We are not dealing with one single terrorist organization but with alliance of groupings. Thus the biggest challenge Africa is facing, is failure to understand the dynamics of the situation at a national, regional and international level. Western governments however do provide support in tracing anti-terrorist units in the fight against terrorism as well as relevant intelligence. At the same time, intelligence agencies in African countries also contribute to the flow of information in support of the Western efforts.

2.10 Challenges of Fighting Terrorism Africa

Early warning of terrorist attacks is a challenge for all security services, unlike is Europe where security services have a good track record in uncovering planned attacks before they take place as we have seen in many cases both in Europe and the USA. However, this only works if one has informers or the man power available to conduct discrete observation over a long period of time.

This is not a skill which one can acquire overnight, nor is it easy task. It depends on cast Iron security within the agencies conducting observations. This is not the case in many African countries where some governments themselves have no clear agenda in fighting terrorism. In some instances members of the government are part of the problem thus making Covert operations difficult at best. This is why the researcher earlier on mentioned that good governance is a pre-requisite for effective CT measures. The challenge in Somalia for example is the lack of the Intelligence Community to understand the role of clan, family and sub-clan structure that govern Somalia life. They least understand these structures and know how to mobilize, motivate and use these forces to their advantage, particularly in the urban areas of Mogadishu. It is part of the reason why AMISOM is still having a challenge in stabling Somalia. The threat of terrorism is evolving and the evolving threat has taken new forms for example, individuals are being radicalized by the internet and extremist websites in various parts of the world.

During the UN Sec-Council 6767th Meeting to hear briefings from the chairs of its three anti-terrorism committees, the counter terrorism committee, the Al-Qaeda committee and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction committee. Ron Prosor of Israelis quoted to have said that while the council had been discussing the issue of terrorism for decades, many states still spoke about it as if they were discussing “lightning strike.” For too many, terrorism was something abstract and remote, until it finally struck them; He stated that unless we do something, we will all face its deadly consequences tomorrow. He mentioned that his country (Israel) was proud to share its unique expertise with others in the global fight against terrorism. As a nation state it was closely engaged in capacity building initiatives with a number of states and regional organizations in Africa, South America and Asia. While discussing several current challenges he mentioned that the prevalence of incitement around the world called for the international community’s immediate action. The growing nexus between terrorism and transnational criminal networks presented another acute challenge. The Hezbollah activities for example are established as major players in the global narcotics market and have offered an example of the disturbing trend. The misuse of cyber is another area of growing concern; increasingly the web has become a central hub for spreading incitement and glorifying terrorism. Prosor also stressed the Iranian Terrorist attacks, including those emanating from the Gaza strip, as of major concern as was the situation in Syria where president Bashar al-Assad terrorizes his own people as he spreads terrorism around the world. The UN established three committees to enforce their security council’s counter terrorism measures and related sanctions. The bodies

established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) on CT and resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the Al-Qaeda committee. The committees were tasked to enhance cooperation with international, regional and sub-regional bodies. Increase information sharing, participation in joint meetings and maintaining reciprocal representation as appropriate. The committee's group of experts plays a pertinent role in advising states seeking assistance in building CT capacity. Terrorism continues to threaten international peace and security and its nature is constantly evolving, requiring continuous adaptation as well as strengthened cooperation in the international response.

2.10.1 The Role of Regional Economic Communities (REC) in fighting Terrorism in Africa. Case of (IGAD)

In Africa, REC was initially established to tackle the economic challenges of the continent. Over time they expanded their mandate to deal with the security threats of the continent such as terrorism and piracy. Following September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the USA, REC such as (IGAD) ECOWAS (SADC) and others through their security institutions have been giving considerable attention to preventing and combating Terrorism in their respective regions, since then the fight against Terrorism has become an international phenomenon whereby international and regional economic communities have taken the issues of combating terrorism as a priority in their efforts to maintain international peace and security. The UN through its UNSC resolution 1373 (2011) recognized and mandated RECs as evaluable means of battling terrorism due to its transnational Nature (Rosand, *et al*, 2008). Following that, several RECS's established legal and institutional regimes within the context of their regional peace and security frame works to prevent and combat terrorism. Besides, they have also developed CT strategies that reflect the terrorist organizations within their own regional contexts. The OAU adopted the convention on the prevention and combating terrorism in 1999. The AU plan of action adopted in 2002 provided a frame work and Road map for RECs and African states to implement international counter-terrorism measures as provided in the OAU convention. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in 1996 to supersede the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) and fighting terrorism has been one of the international obligations of IGAD. Following the adoption of the Draft implementation plan to counter terrorism in 2003, IGAD has taken a more proactive role in strengthening cooperation against terrorism and transnational Organized crimes in the region (CGCC and ISSP, 2012).

2.10.1.1 Examples of Terrorism acts within the IGAD Region

Terrorism acts perpetrated by organizations coming from outside the region (i.e. International terrorism e.g. Al-Qaeda groups responsible for the 1998 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania respectively. The 2002 Al-Qaeda attacks at Mombasa Kenya against an Israel airliner and the bombing of an Israel owned hotel popular with Israel Tourists (Molla, 2002, Pgs 43-44). There are also acts of terrorism committed by organizations within IGAD region against neighboring states, for example a series of attacks which have been carried by Somali based Al-Shabaab against civilian targets in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. There were also terrorism attacks instigated by Insurgent groups fighting the governments from within a given state by non-state actors with the aim of taking control of government, influence policy of government, secessionist tendencies or just to charge the regime by deliberately harming civilian populations examples include, ADF, Orgaden National Liberation (ONLF) & Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia (Medhane, 2007)

Recognizing the security gap in the region, the IGAD member states agreed to work together to be able to deal effectively with terrorism threats where the draft implementation plan was consequently adopted by IGAD states in 2003 in Kampala with the purpose of combating terrorism. It was the first major step towards a common legal frame work. Another further step taken by IGAD in combating terrorism was the adoption of the security strategy in 2010; IGAD member states ratified several international conventions on combating terrorism. The major one was the UN convention on the suppression of financing terrorism and then the AU convention for the prevention of terrorism, (CGCC & ISSP, 2012).

IGAD has also been working with the USA led Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the Horn of Africa (HOA) in their attempt to combat terrorism. The CJTF-HOA's mission is to detect, disrupt, defeat and deny terrorist activities in the horn of Africa. Other countries involved include Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya etc. whereby CJTF provides military training to these countries. In 2006 IGAD through capacity building program against terrorism (ICPAT) launched a programme in Addis Ababa targeting five areas; (1) enhancing judicial capacity (2) working to promote greater Inter-agency coordination on CT with individual IGAD member states, (3) enhancing border control to the security sector (4) providing training, sharing information and best practices and (5) promoting strategic cooperation.

According to Nzau, (2010) and Shinn, (2008) through its KPA/ISSP, IGAD has been performing the following practical activities with the intention of combating Terrorism and to ensure peace and security in the region: working on democracy, Development and Inter-connectedness bearing in mind that the structural problems on which terrorism thrives are attributed to poverty, unemployment, ignorance bad governance, disorder, insecurity extremist ideology and lack of tolerance as well as state failure. Another strategy is facilitating and backing (unilateral or collective). Interventions against Terrorism, in Somalia on March 2006, IGAD mandated Ethiopia to deploy a peace keeping force in Somalia to fight the Islamic Courts Union. This was later followed by Uganda's deployment of UPDF in 2007 under (Amisom). As a fighting strategy against terrorism IGAD has been introducing sanctions, including travel and financial bans on suspected terrorists, individuals and organizations suspected of supporting terrorism.

2.10.2 Challenges of IGAD

One of the main challenges of IGAD in the fight against terrorism has been identified to be lack of trust amongst member states due to the legacy of inter-state and intra-state conflicts which characterize the region. For example some member states hosting or supporting rebel groups fighting other member states. On the other hand there are also difference on the definition of the concept of terrorism and lack of cooperation among member states in fighting domestic terrorism is a challenge mainly due to the dynamic nature of Terrorism, were by member states do not have a united definition of what constitutes Terrorism and who is considered as a terrorist. Other challenges according to Shin (2008) include overreliance on hard power and extrajudicial options in dealing with Terrorism and external aid, Weak integration of legal and policy frame works, Lack of financial capacity and coordination among others.

2.11 Terrorism in East Africa

East Africa is composed of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan. It is important to note that; East African region also witnessed the analogous happenings like other parts of the global world. Some notable incidents include Al-Qaeda terrorists attack on the US Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania respectively on 8th 1998. According to CNN (1998), Nairobi attack claimed more than 200 lives including 12 US citizens leaving over 4000 wounded. CNN further revealed that this was part of a coordinated attack in which a similar device denoted almost simultaneously at the US embassy in Dar-salaam, Tanzania, Killing 11 and wounding 85 people. On the same note, another sad happening took place on September 21st, 2013 when Somali based Al-Shabaab attacked Westgate Shopping Mall in the Kenyan Capital, Nairobi in

which there was a 4 day standoff where the perpetrators held hostages on site before rescue, and about 67 people were confirmed dead and 175 were wounded as reported by BBC focus on Africa (2013). A Similar incident reoccurred in the morning hours of April 2nd, 2015 at Garrisa University College where 147 students were killed and 79 injured as reported by the New York Times on April 2nd, 2015. Annoyingly, the same Al-Shabaab claimed the responsibility for the second attack in Kenya as a revenge for Kenyan contribution to AMISOM campaigns against their activities in Somalia. This particular attack was unique because for the first time, Al-Shabaab attacked an educational target; the group appeared to have invested heavily in its intelligence gathering capabilities as a strategy to modernize its planning and operations.

2.11.1 Role played by EAC states and their security Stakeholders

The East African Community leaders have raised up a common voice to have a united front to fight acts of terrorists in the region and in 2014 the president of Kenya Uhuru Kenyatta in the Arusha summit revealed that the region had resolved to send African message to the perpetrators of terrorism activities that they would live no stone unturned. They resolved to implement a common antiterrorism strategy to combat terrorism and other transnational crimes. All security agencies of the member states were encouraged to increase their areas of cooperation to fight terrorism, insurgencies and transnational crimes within the region. But the most unfortunate part to this resolve was the successful attack in 2015 of Garrisa University, in Kenya. Accordingly, the leaders of the Great lakes region called for renewed efforts in the fight against all groups of terrorists including ADF, a terrorist rebel group based in the DRC which has for over two decades waged war against Uganda. The GLR members include; Uganda, Angola, DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, CAR, Zambia and the Republic of Congo (New Vision, 16th of June, 2016).

Rwanda, for example has increased surveillance of its Airports, border controls and patrols as well as security of her Hotel Industry whereby guests are registered upon checking into the Hotels. This is done with an effort to identify potential terrorists. Rwanda has also established an Intercontinental terrorist committee and also has antiterrorism section in the police unit similar to the one Uganda has. This unit comprises an elite group of officers who are highly trained to counter terrorist attacks when it occurs. They undergo regular exercises to keep themselves fit and prepared for any eventuality which is probably the reason why there are few cases of terrorism experienced in Rwanda.

2.11.2 South African Development Community (SADC)

These countries have adopted the SADC regional CT strategy to prevent Terrorism activities which is modeled on the UN counter terrorism strategy and the Bogota guiding principles for counter terrorism strategies. The strategy was adopted by SADC heads of state summit on 18th August 2015. However this strategy has not been able to stop terrorism activities completely. This is evidenced by the 2017 terrorist attacks of police stations in Mozambique which are usually categorized as hard targets. Again in June this year 2018, the extremist group burnt villages in Mozambique killing many people and forcing others to flee their homes. These groups who claim to be followers of the prophet Mohammed use religion to radicalize the youth which is a big challenge to security. (BBC Focus on Africa – 19/06/18).

2.11.3 Terrorism in Uganda and the role played by security and other agencies at the national level.

Much as Uganda is not located at the risky and absorbent (porous) spot where terrorists such as the Al-Shabaab can easily enter and go out easily, the recent attacks of Kyadondo rugby club and Ethiopian restaurant and bar bombings in Kampala on July 11th 2010 which formed the basis of this research study was a clear warning that terrorists can attack any country with surprise and without discrimination as long as an opportunity is available to them. The East African Weekly (June 3rd 2016) reported how the Kampala twin bombings were successful through syndicate arrangements between the Somali based Al-Shabaab and some indigenous indoctrinated Ugandans.

According to the guardian paper of 12, July 2010 report, the local intelligence officials would have been less surprised because a few months earlier the government had distributed posters in Kampala warning people in Kampala to be aware that a terrorist attack was imminent but it appeared that the security and the public in general relaxed somehow their vigilance leading to the terrorists exploitation of the security gaps to accomplish their mission. These attacks confirm that terrorism activities have become part of the transnational crimes owing to globalization trends. Details of how the July 11, 2010 attacks were planned and executed according the security officials who participated in the post blast investigation were as follows; Suicide bombers allied to Al-Shabaab/Al Qaeda with direct links to Somalia blew themselves among crowds of soccer fans watching the world cup finals between Spain and the Netherlands in South Africa.

According to security sources who visited the scene, a cell phone fitted and connected to explosives was recovered at the crime scene (Nokia 105) which was used as a trigger device to set off the explosives which killed 76 people and left scores injured. Uganda, Kenya and the FBI agency were involved in the post blast investigations where 13 suspects were arrested and charged before counts of law and five of them were successfully convicted and sentenced to serve long prison jail terms. Earlier on before the attacks, Al-shabaab top leader had warned in an audio message that Uganda would face retaliation for its role in supporting the western backed Somalia transitional government where Uganda contributed by taking a lead role in providing troops to Somalia in 2007 under AMISOM. This should have called for more heightened security measures especially during the time of the world cup which in the researcher's opinion was ignored. Analysis of the events leading to the attacks revealed the following information: Telephone print outs from the recovered phones assisted the investigators to identify the main planners of the attacks, further information was also obtained by the investigators that bombs were kept at a safe house in Namasuba where the suicide bombers had rented accommodation.

According to the investigations, terrorist money was being wired from the U.K to Kenya from a known terrorist financier (OMAR AZIZ AL SAADI) which was then used for funding the Kampala bombings. Investigations further revealed that ISSA AHMED LUYIMA (A Ugandan) with a previous criminal record was reported to have planned the Kampala attacks together with other terrorists from Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, U.K. Information obtained by security revealed that the planners of the attacks relocated to Kampala from rented houses in Nairobi as early as June 2010. According to the cell phones communication obtained, the final planning was later done at Namasuba in Kampala. Suicide vests were transported from Nairobi to Kampala by one Hajar Seleman Nyamadondo (Tanzanian) in the company of one Mohamed Mugisha (Ugandan). This combination serves to show that terrorism is one of the transnational organized crimes which do not know boundaries, religion or ethnicity. It is usually very well planned and it is the reason security is most times taken unaware when terrorists strike.

Terrorists are so good at exploiting weaknesses within our security apparatus. The case of Kampala twin bombings was unique in such a manner that both suicide bombing and the use of improvised explosive devices were used as was evidenced by the discovery of a human head, suicide vest and undetonated homemade bomb at the scene. This means that combinations of

tactics were used by the terrorists to execute their mission. This incidence caught the security agencies off guard as the terrorists were able to enter both premises without being noticed and were even able to plant the bombs unchallenged. The researcher believes that lack of proper access control and vigilance by security at both scenes of crime was the main contributing factor to the gaps that the terrorists exploited to enable them to accomplish their mission. Had the security stakeholders played their roles effectively prior to the attacks, the country would not have witnessed a tragedy of such a magnitude. As a result of the above, some security measures have been put in place where security in Uganda has been restructured by creating different squadrons to handle different aspects of security. For example the Joint Anti-terrorism task force (JATT) has been strengthened by creating units such as the bomb squad, sniffer dogs, marine units to patrol waters, community policing units of the police, compulsory registration of SIM cards, crime intelligence units, Joint intelligence committees, introduction of surveillance drones, training of specialized units in fighting urban terrorism among others.

However, in spite of these reforms, there remain a number of challenges to be addressed, for example the challenge of the porous borders. There is also a challenge of some Islamic religious groups which come into the country disguised as charity organizations setting mosques, schools which in turn are used as recruitment and training grounds for innocent and vulnerable youth for terrorist activities, a case in point are the Madarasa schools which were discovered in Sseso Islands in 2014 and were being used to recruit for ADF in the DRC and the recent discovery at Usafi mosque where security officers arrested some suspects who were believed to be involved in some criminality. There is also a challenge of funding for security agencies to train, purchase equipment for detection of terrorist crime in the country, challenge of many unemployed youth who can easily be lured to get involved in terrorist activities for economic survival among many others.

It is also important to note that before the July, 11 incident; Uganda had earlier on experienced terrorist activities as early as the 1990s up to 2000s by the ADF and the LRA Insurgents. The allied democratic force (ADF) is a rebel group in Uganda currently operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and is considered by the government of Uganda as a terrorist group. It was originally based in the Ruwenzori Mountains before extending its activities to Eastern DRC where it would launch its rebel attacks into the western parts of Uganda. Since the late 1990s, the ADF has operated in the DRCs north Kivu Province near the border with Uganda

up-to-date. The ADF was formed by puritanical Muslim Ugandans of the Tabliqhi-Jamaat group who merged with a remnant of another rebel group “the national army for the liberation of Uganda,” (NALU). The main figure of the group was Jamil Mukulu, a former Christian who converted into Islam; he was arrested in Tanzania in 2015 and is now held in Luzira prison as a terrorism suspect undergoing trial in the courts of Law. The ADF members are largely drawn from central Uganda, in particular, Iganga, Masaka and Kampala and portray themselves as religious crusaders. While repeated military offensives against the ADF have severely affected it, the ADF has been able to regenerate its recruitment and its financial networks have remained intact probably due to support from Islamic terrorist groups and some countries opposed to the Ugandan government. From 1997-2002, the ADF were responsible for Kichwamba Technical School students massacre, bomb blasts in Kampala city where bombs were thrown into drinking places, taxis and public places such as Nakulabye, Kabalagala, Wandegeya and the city center among others.

During the height of the ADF rebellion in Uganda, Gen Henry Tumukunde by then the chief of military intelligence suggested the need to coordinate all security agencies such as ISO, ESO, CMI, UPDF, and UPF in order to deal with ADF. They came up with a joint operations unit which later came to be known as Joint anti-Terrorism task Force (JATT) which comprised all the above mentioned units. This team is on record to have ended the regular blasts that had rocked Kampala city and its suburbs. This later gave birth to the antiterrorism Act 2002 which is meant to suppress acts of terrorism and to provide for punishment of persons who plan, instigate, support, finance, or execute acts of terrorism. Antiterrorism Act also allows for the interception of communication and conduct surveillance of persons suspected of committing any offence under the act for purpose of safeguarding the public interest, safeguarding the national economy from terrorism, prevention of the violation of the fundamental and other Human rights and freedoms of any person from terrorism, prevention and detecting the commission of any offence under the Act. Bomb blasts in Kampala led to some arrest of suspects who were held in safe houses for interrogation before being charged with different crimes. This later raised an alarm from the Uganda human rights commission and other non-governmental organizations criticizing the process where suspects were allegedly tortured and kept for more than 48 legal hours before being charged in Court. This is one of the challenges faced by security agencies in their fight against terrorism in Uganda. Terrorism investigations are more complicated than other crimes

whereby “within 48 hours” stipulated by the 1995 constitution of the Republic of Uganda, it is not easy to complete investigations before suspects are arraigned in court.

2.11.4 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)

According to Onyango (2003), this is a rebel group which operated in the Northern, and Eastern parts of Uganda as well as South Sudan during the late 1980s up to 2006 when they were driven out of the Country to DRC and CAR respectively by the UPDF. Its stated goal includes the establishment of government in Uganda based on the Ten Commandments of the Holy Bible, though in practice, the group seems not to be clearly motivated by any identifiable political agenda, as its military tactics and strategy reflect this. It appears to largely function as a personality cult of its leader Joseph Kony, a self-declared prophet who claims to be fighting in the name of God. The LRA has been listed as a terrorist group by United States due to its wide spread human rights violations including murder, abduction, mutilations, rape, sexual-slavery and conscription of children to join its ranks.

Robert Gersony, in a report funded by USA Embassy in Kampala in 1997 concluded that LRA has no political programme or ideology at least any that the local population has heard or understands. Although not proven, there had been rumors that the government of Sudan was providing military support to the LRA in response to Uganda's lending support to Sudan People’s liberation Army (SPLA) before South Sudan became a nation on July 9th 2011. The LRA has since been weakened as its numbers have drastically reduced due to the capture, surrender and killing of most of its members by UPDF and other forces from the neighboring countries with support of the Special Forces from the USA.

2.11.5 Constitutional mandates of Different Security agencies and other Stakeholders in Uganda

The following are the different security agencies responsible for general security and the fight against terrorism and other Crimes in Uganda;

2.11.5.1 Public Security Organizations and their Roles

These are organizations of state mandated to ensure safety and security of the state as well as its citizens. These include the UPDF, UPF, UPS, and the intelligence services ISO, CMI, ESO and CI. Each of these organizations has their own command structure from the top to the bottom. For example, the Chief of Defense Forces (CDF) for the military, Inspector General of Police (IGP)

for the police, Commissioner of Prisons for Prisons Services and Director's General for the Intelligence Services. Below are different Roles assigned to some to the above organizations?

2.11.5.2 Uganda People's Defense Forces

Uganda People's Defense Forces Act 2005 established the UPDF with the following functions; (a) to preserve and defend the sovereignty and interior integrity of Uganda (b) to co-operate with civilian authority in emergencies like cases of natural disasters (c) to foster harmony and understanding between the defense forces and civilians.

2.11.5.3 The Uganda Police Force (UPF)

The police Act 2006 (As Amended) established the Uganda Police Force with its functions as follows; (a) to protect the life, property and other rights of the individual (b) to maintain security within Uganda, (c) to enforce the laws of Uganda (d) to ensure public safety and order (e) to detect and prevent crime

2.11.5.4 Security Organization's Act CAP 305

The security organization's Act of November 13th 1987 provides for the establishment of Internal Security Organization (ISO) and External Security Organization (ESO) as government departments. Their Major Functions Include; (1) to collect, receive and process internal and external intelligence data on the security of Uganda in order to inform Governance decisions making (2) to advise and recommend to the president or any other authority as the president may direct on what action should be taken in connection with that intelligence data.

2.11.5.5 Private Security Organizations

The police control of private security organizations regulation,2013, defines PSO as an organization which undertakes private investigations as to facts or as to the character of a person or an organization which undertakes training services in security matters and firearms, range services all which perform the purpose of providing protection against crime. The IGP is given powers to supervise and regulate the activities of PSOs in Uganda. The term Private Security refers to security services provided by non-state agencies. This is a new concept in Africa and Uganda in particular; and its growth has been facilitated by the desire to reduce the burden on state agencies of protecting their citizens. The state relinquished part of its role of providing security to other actors such as private security organizations. This is mainly because of limitation of resources and the increased nature of threats which the state cannot single handedly

handle. Inadequate resources to equip state organs have been the major decision driver in the growth of the sector in Uganda and Africa as a whole. PSOs work closely with the National police force and they complement one another in the protection of life and property of the citizens through joint patrols, investigations, guard duties, access control among other duties. Most PSOs in Uganda are indigenous companies, save for a few which are foreign and operate within the central part of the country, because it's the business hub of the country. But how effective are they? It is the reason why this research study was undertaken to establish facts on the ground.

2.11.5.6 Crime Preventers

These are people who are selected by their respective communities to work as volunteers in crime detection and prevention. They were trained by police and passed out to go back to work within their communities. They acted as a link between the community and the police. But the challenge with them is that some of them have also got involved into some criminality hence defeating the purpose for which they were recruited initially.

2.11.5.7 Research's Comment in relation to the Constitutional mandates given to different Security agencies in Uganda

The question then arises that have these various security agencies mentioned above executed their mandates to the full satisfaction of the citizens of Uganda? Are they hand cupped by any means e.g. manpower technical capabilities or resources? Or is it a problem of command and control alongside Inter agency Rivalary. The research was premised upon the fact that there are many security incidents which have occurred and have eluded the watchful eye of security agencies and in the researchers opinion there must be a problem somewhere within the security stake holders who have been entrusted with providing security to the people of Uganda. It is this question in the mind of the researcher that prompted the research study which was undertaken to look at the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threat (SWOT) analysis of their performance and to come up with recommendations to feel the identified gaps and challenges to ensure peace and security of the country. 2017 alone saw rising tensions between the police, ISO and CMI. The public got so concerned that the squabbling was likely to compromise national security and hand the enemy the chance to strike. This continued bickering is diverting them from the real work they are mandated to do. These questions have bothered Ugandans since the surge in insecurity marked by violet killings of Muslim clerics and government officials, unexplained rape and

mysterious killings of women, kidnaps for ransom and or murder and burglaries to name but a few. The emerging pattern of targeted killings of policemen on patrol and gun grabs present the possibility of a more sophisticated criminal network, warning messages of impending attacks and execution of the threats in some parts of the country raise questions about a possible organized group. By eroding human security, this keeps citizens worried and has diminished faith in government assurance to protect the citizens of Uganda. The current wave of security concerns among the public prompted the president to come up with some security measures geared towards fighting crime in the country including terrorism. Below are the security measures he came up with: (1) Lifting finger prints from all guns in the country to identify criminals (2) all motorcycles to have electronic number plates installed at the cost of the owner (3) banning hooded jackets for Boda-Boda riders and having illuminated helmets bearing numbers both in front and at the back (4) ensuring that CCTV cameras in towns, roads, streets and along the highways which should have thermal sensors to help capture criminals both day and night (5) installing a modern forensic laboratory to register all Deoxyribo Nucleic Acid (DNA) to help in collecting the DNA of criminals at the scene of crime, e.g sweat and hair (6) revival of 999 operations for quick response to SOS and to revamp flying squad (7) introduction of unmanned Aerial vehicles/drones (8) cracking down on social media who spread negative propaganda and lies (9) acquiring more scanners for URA to inspect containers on the border to avoid gun smuggling.

2.11.5.8 Gaps and challenges of fighting terrorism in General

Comprehensive attempts to bring to an end to the human acts of terrorism have been sought by world leaders, regional governments, and peace promoting independent bodies with little success. According to the Global Regime for Terrorism report (2013), September 11, 2001, attacks shocked the international community, changing the perspectives on how the world perceives the threats of terrorism and the tools required to prevent it. The event proved to the world that fighting terrorism is not a simple task but one that requires a global effort. To be specific, the international counterterrorism regime continues to suffer from three main weaknesses: the lack of a universal agreement over what constitutes terrorism which has weakened the efforts to formulate a concerted global response. Secondly, multilateral actions suffer from inadequate compliance and enforcement of the existing instruments. Thirdly, limited resources and expertise have been lacking. At the global levels, gun purchasing laws have not been well restricted. According to HUFFPOST an online news publication (June 13th 2016), a

US congress member blamed some nations for failing to close the terror gaps by allowing individuals on the watch list to continue to purchase guns that are always used to terrorize the innocent population. Uganda's terror attacks for example occurred during the time the world was watching the FIFA World Cup final between Spain and the Netherlands on Sunday night, minutes before the end of the match. For Ugandans, the attacks represented the reality of the longstanding threat from Al-Shabaab militants from Somalia which had for years been promising to attack Uganda as punishment for its support to the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia (AMISON). Security coverage during this period should have been key especially in places where people were gathered to watch football but unfortunately there seemed to be limited security coverage. The indiscriminate nature, timing, and locations of the attacks demonstrated that Al-Shabaab had the capacity to avenge their grievances beyond the borders of Somalia though previously most people thought that the threat was contained within Somalia, an attack from the Al-Shabaab was not entirely unexpected before the bombings.

Indeed, immediately following the attack, Sheik Yusuf an Al-Shabaab commander then, is quoted to have stated, *“Uganda is one of our enemies, whatever makes them cry makes us happy, may Allah's anger be upon those who are against us”*

There was also an announcement by Sheik Ali Mohamud Rage, Al-shabaab spokesperson the next day of the attack that Uganda had been warned not to deploy troops to Somalia but had ignored therefore the explosions in Kampala were a minor message and they were prepared to target Ugandans everywhere if Uganda did not withdraw from their land. This threat, I believe still stands as long as Ugandan troops are still in Somalia and the security gaps which can easily be exploited by the terrorists still exist.

Responding effectively to the threat of terrorism would therefore require concerted effort of the International and regional groups. Uganda needs to learn from mistakes made around the world in preventing and combating terrorism in order to close the security gaps in the fight against terrorism. Failure to do so will simply strengthen the appeal of terrorism groups to introduce new cycles of terrorism. A more holistic approach that aims to find a lasting road to peace in Somalia and other countries is the only viable solution to this profound threat of terrorism to peace, stability and territorial integrity of our state. In the researcher's opinion, the big challenge is that Ugandans are not good at policing themselves; this is evidenced by the fact that people are not

conscious about strangers around them and everyone seems to care about themselves alone. Fulfilling the old edge “every one for himself and God for us all”

There are numerous examples where terrorists have breached security measures and caused a lot of havoc on lives of people and property in various places internationally: For example, The attacks of the Iranian parliament and the mausoleum of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Central Tehran on June 7, 2017. This incident exposed shortcomings among the Revolutionary Guards corps (IRGC) who were supposed to be protecting these potent symbols of Iran's revolution. The attack according to BBC news was orchestrated by members of the Islamic state, a locally born Jihadist group who established a network of support in the country.

This attack was an wake up call for security apparatus in Iran to review their security measures, which led to open discussions on security vulnerabilities in the country.

Other examples include;

The London subway train attack of the year 2005 in Britain happened in spite of the enormous amount of technological capabilities that exist among security agencies (e.g. Good surveillance measures) and a strong intelligence service in place. It is therefore ironical that the attacker still made it onto a train with an explosive device where (ISIS) a radical Islamic group claimed responsibility for the attack. This confirms the fact that there are always some security gaps and lapses which can be exploited by the determined terrorists.

The Las Vegas shooting also left a lot of questions unanswered, 59 people were shot dead and over 500 injured by a wealthy retired accountant, Stephen Paddock who according to CNN had in his possession 47 fire arms with thousands of ammunition undetected by security agencies. The suspect was able to check into the 32nd floor of a hotel room where he shot at the crowd through his hotel window. This was during a country music concert which was attended by estimated 22,000 strong audiences. In the researchers view, this was an event which should have been given a high security attention but apparently security did not envisage any threat coming from any quarter hence the huge security gap which led to a disaster.

Some of the questions that lingered in the minds of security experts are: why didn't the security of the Hotel subject this guest to security screening as well as his baggage? How strict are the Gun laws in that country?

In the researcher's opinion, some of these gaps are created due to some level of laxity among security personnel and other stake holders mandated to protect the citizens of the country such as Immigration and border control among others. On most occasions, governments react when a situation has happened. It is also sometimes hard to articulate the need for resources or manpower before the problem occurs which is a challenge. It is also sometimes simply the reality of bureaucracy that it often takes a tragedy to force change and that it must first take a bombing and loss of lives and property to get resources thrown at the problem. One important point to note through, is that however much resources are available to counter threats of terrorism, people must realize that nothing in life is completely safe, people also have to realize that the soft targets in general far surpass capacity for public security to protect so there are always inherent risks on day to day life and there are certain things you are not going to be able to protect. Ultimately, the best one can hope for is that security measures keep that risk within acceptable limits, 100 percent is not the ideal but just to make it safe enough that one can carry on with business and personal activities within reasonable bounds of security.

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the pentagon left many unanswered question as well in the minds of many people. Why were the law enforcement and intelligence agencies not able to discover the planned attacks? How was the performance on that day of the Federal Aviation administration which is mandated to manage the nation's Air traffic? What about the North American Aerospace defense command (NORAD) which is responsible for the defense of American Airspace? Where were they?

Apparently the focus of (NORAD) was directed outward towards threats that might approach Americas Coastlines without anticipating the threats from within which was a big loop hole that was exploited by the terrorists. The attacks occurred on a Tuesday morning of September 11, 2001 when 19 militants associated with the Islamic extremists group Al-Qaeda led by the late Osama Bin Laden who was killed by the American Navy seals in a hide out at Abbottabad in Pakistan on May 2, 2011. It is believed that the attacks were carried out in retaliation for America's support of Israel, US involvement in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and her continued military presence in the Middle East. Two Boston flights that hit the world trade centre were American owned airlines Boeing 767 flight 11 and united Airlines flight 175. Flight 11 hit the North tower while flight 175 hit the South tower. Flight 77 American Airline hit the pentagon mean while United Airlines flight 93 crashed into a rural field near Shanksville in Western

Pennsylvania after its passengers tried to retake the Aircraft after leaving Newark liberty Airport in New Jersey. These were very embarrassing incidents for the US as a world power and questions were asked how terrorists could easily hijack her planes and use them to kill her own people. About 3000 lives were lost during the attacks. (914 Death statistics, statistics Brain.com) it is further alleged that some of the terrorists had lived in the US for more than one year and had taken flying lessons undetected at American Commercial Flying Schools while others had sneaked into the country months before the September 11, 2001 attacks. The 19 attackers were able to easily smuggle Box-cutters and knives through security checks at three East coast airports and boarded early morning flights bound for California which they later turned into guided missiles to their targets. All these happened under the watchful eyes of the massive security presence in the US who become helpless at that time. Both NORAD and FAA official response to the criticism of the attacks was that they had established chains of communication and Army generals had been given authority to order the fighter pilots to shoot down any hijacked aircraft. The number of war planes on alert had been increased, and fighters had been put on patrol over the US cities and events deemed to be possible terrorist targets.

According to the researcher, these actions were only reactionary by the security stake holders in the aftermath of the incident because these should have been done much earlier as proactive measures to avert such kind of devastating incidents before they happen. It also revealed the fact that no country the world over is able to prevent acts of criminality 100 percent if a world power such as the US can suffer such embarrassing incident as the September 11, 2001 attack despite the robust security apparatus they have.

Kristen Breitweiser of middle town New York whose husband, Ronald died in the world trade centre during the attack is quoted to have said: “I think we were ill prepared, and I think people showed poor judgment, the plane that crashed into the pentagon could have been stopped” (September 11th Terror Attacks Fast facts CNN). US response later came in October 7, 2001 when the American led international force (NATO) invaded Afghanistan in an operation code named “Operation Enduring Freedom” to oust the Taliban regime and destroy Osama Bin Laden terrorist Network based there. This came following a televised address by President George W. Bush from the oval office declaring that America would make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them. In spite of all the above,

Terrorist groups continue to seek to exploit security gaps in their attempts to fulfill their expectations.

In his speech abroad on Tuesday May 23, 2017 President D. Trump to his audience of Muslim leaders in S. Arabia declared that America was committed to adjusting her strategies to meet evolving threats and new facts and that they would discard those strategies that have not worked and will apply new approaches informed by experience and judgment. In the opinion of the researcher, this is the way to go. A new draft of the white house highlights the need to intensify operations against global Jihadist groups and place more burdens to countering Terrorism groups. There is also a growing body of research on what drives support for Terrorism, it is generally believed that not religion, ideology or the internet which are the only drivers for terrorism support, rather military or police abuses of one's own population are among the single largest drivers of terrorism recruitment. Corruption and the biased delivery of public services that erodes the trust between the Government and its citizens are also among the key sources of grievance within communities that terrorist propaganda exploits. Issues of promoting Human Rights, development, good governance and other soft power tools are important. Other causes include: Social environment – Individuals living conditions, broken families (conflicts) frustrations which can easily be exploited by terrorists groups to recruit especially the young people. These elements create the ideal conditions to raise terrorists' interest. Economic motives – poverty, the gap between the Rich and the Poor, destitution, unfavorable distribution of wealth can trigger unhealthy behaviors that can degenerate into terrorism acts.

Difficulties to identify the enemy especially due to the fact that there are no common signals between terrorists as they are recruited in different countries, ethnicities and groups which make tracking and defeating them quite a hard task as well as missions organized especially in other countries and executed by local cells as was the case of July 11th, 2010 in Uganda

Payne (2009) points out the cost of fighting terrorism generally as he looks at the individual cost in terms of loss of innocent lives during the process of countering terrorists, economic cost e.g. Airlines financial losses, expenses of providing security to the public by governments, reconstructions after damages, foreign policy where states shift their diplomatic ties with those they don't read from the same page/script.

Payne, 2009, also points out the challenge of dealing with domestic or home grown terrorism. He cites the example of the April 19, 1995 where a son of the Soil, Timothy MC Veigh (Gulf war veteran) killed Americans in a federal building in Oklahoma City. The American citizens were laying blame on the terrorism groups in the Middle East not knowing that the terrorism act was perpetrated by one of their own. Military interventions against terrorist groups such as AMISOM in Somali are very expensive and last for several years which require the need to prioritize preventive measures. The challenge of ideas in understanding the nature of the terrorist threat today and how to deal with it is huge knowing that the war on terrorism is a new kind of war. Terrorism certainly is not monolithic, each group is unique in its own way and these groups are dynamic and evolving in nature. We are now experiencing two categories of terrorism – old terrorism and a new type of terrorism. The old type of terrorism was limited to a particular cause, examples are the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in UK, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) in Columbia, Euskadita Askatasuna or Bosque Country and Freedom (ETA) in Spain, Palestinian Israel conflict among others.

New type of terrorism is quite challenging because it presents a different threat, groups like, AL-Qaeda, Al-shabaab, Boko haram, ISIS and others even have apocalyptic ambitions, and such ambitions lead to the search for unlimited means to achieve them. By harnessing the globalization that helps define our era to the destructive potential for chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapons, such groups have become true transnational threats. They operate in countless countries, independent of any state sponsor or single home base.

Fighting terrorism therefore requires a flexible comprehensive strategy, one that encompasses action against Terrorists of all strands as well as a long term approach to win hearts and minds and to prevent new recruits from rising to fill the ranks of those who fall. This will involve simultaneous synchronized and sustained action on four fronts; defeating terrorists, denying terrorists support or safe haven and sponsorship, diminish the underlying conditions that allow Terrorism to thrive and to defend the citizens and interests of the country (4DS). Each of the four Ds should be able to force all security stake holders to think a new so as to consider and generate new ideas and approaches suited to the distinctive threats of this era.

2.11.6 The challenge of Institution Building in fighting terrorism

New ideas however are not enough we must put these ideas into practice and to do that, we need the right institutions, formal and informal, domestic and international. This is the challenge of

Institutional building. For example public diplomacy in trying to reach people through internet, satellite TV to reach new audiences, implementing many of the new notions of security demands new institutions to be established. New relationships between the public and the private sectors work, that brings together government and the private sector research centres and educational institutions.

2.11.7 Challenge of fighting terrorist financing

Terrorists are known to high jack legitimate non-governmental organization (NGOs) to raise and then siphon off money to fund their operations. Best practices must be developed to help charities protect themselves against infiltration and exploitation by criminal and terrorist elements.

There is also the challenge to build a network of mutually reinforcing international institutions that will help coordinate assistance to “weak but willing” countries, sanction states that tolerate or support terrorists.

2.11.8 The Challenge of Intensity (Strength)

Maintaining the intensity of the political will and forward momentum in the fight against terrorism e.g. holding seminars, workshops, equipping border guards with better communication equipment e.g. I24/7 of Interpol, training CT personnel among others. These all involve countless and too often unnoticed support which can easily slip off if there is no political will. There is always a natural tendency for things to gravitate back towards normal long after an incident has occurred towards business as usual.

In an age where terrorists are trying to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction, we cannot afford to backslide. The challenge of intensity is therefore to keep pressing forward relentlessly while avoiding unwarranted complacency when things appear to be improving.

2.11.9 The Challenge of Ideals

Remaining true to the country’s ideals at home and abroad, by striving to build an international order where more countries and peoples are integrated into a world consistent with the interests and values we share with partners, universal values such as R.O.L, respect for individual liberties, open economies, equal justice and religious toleration, a world where these values are embedded as standards, not exceptions, which will be the best antidote to the spread of terrorist acts.

Another serious challenge is the difficulties to identify the enemy especially due to the fact that there are no common signals between terrorists as they are recruited in different countries, ethnicities, and groups which make tracking and defeating them quite a hard task. For example missions are sometimes organized in other countries and executed by local cells here at home.

According to Hoffman (2002), terrorism owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges and counter measures and to continue to identify and exploit its opponent's vulnerabilities which in itself is also a challenge in the fight against terrorism by the concerned authorities.

In summary, this chapter looks at the historical trajectory of terrorism by identifying four waves of terrorism, the anarchist, anti-colonial, new left and the religious wave. It also reviews the changing partners of terrorism and modern terrorist operations, and how terrorists are funded. It also reviews different strategies and reforms put in place by different international and regional bodies as well as states to try to curb acts of terrorism. The research also reviews different roles played by different security stakeholders in fighting terrorism and other related crimes at all levels, the challenges they are faced with and how some of these have been addressed. In conclusion therefore, the intention of this chapter was to draw examples from different areas to try to address the identified problems in the research study.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This Chapter highlights the methodology that was employed in generating data to address the research objectives and which include; the research design, study area, population of the study, sample-size, sampling techniques, data collection tools, data entry and analysis.

3.1 Description of the Study Area

The study took place in Kampala city area which comprises Kampala central, Kawempe, Nakawa, Makindye, and Lubaga divisions. The research therefore covered the areas of Kyadondo Rugby Club Lugogo, Ethiopian Village Restaurant and Bar in Kabalagala, few Selected Supermarkets around Kampala, Hotels, Restaurants, and security agencies within Kampala metropolitan. (Ref. Appendix ii)

3.2 Research Design

According to Mbabazi (2007), a research design is a plan or means or an approach used to obtain data for a specific study.

Pauline (2007) defines a research design as a plan of what data to gather, from whom, how and when to collect it and how to analyze the data obtained.

According to Bogere *et al*, (2015), a research design is therefore an indication of the basic structure of the study. It constitutes the blue print for the collection, measurement, and analysis of data needed for the research topic. This study adopted a descriptive research design which the researcher found relevant to be used to collect data for the study.

In order to satisfy the objectives of the intended study, both qualitative and quantitative research approaches were applied. The main characteristic of qualitative research is that it is mostly appropriate for small samples, while its outcomes are not measurable and quantifiable. Its basic advantage, which also constitutes its basic difference with quantitative research, is that it offers a complete description (words) and analysis of a research subject, without limiting the scope of the research and the nature of participant's responses (Collis & Hussey, 2003).

The study applied qualitative approach because it involved creating openness by encouraging people to expand on their responses, this was done through physical distribution of the research instruments which include; distribution of questionnaires, focus group discussions, key informant interviews and observations. While quantitative research approach was used because its provides information about universal circumstances by gathering primary data through distribution of questionnaires and collecting them back for analysis mainly using figures.

3.3 Study Population and Sample Selection Procedure

Bogere *et al*,(2015) explain a study population to mean a total group/class or population which the research is drawing his or her sample size from to participate in the research. The total population of Kampala metropolitan as per 2014 national census was 1,516, 210 people (UBOS, 2014 National Census). Different security agencies within Kampala, management of Kyadondo rugby club and Ethiopian Village Restaurant and bar were the major interest of the study because they were able to provide first-hand information regarding the incidents that took place in 2010, how it happened and what was done later by different stakeholders (concerned persons) to address the security situation.

Where N = population, n = sample size, $e = (0.05)^2$ = is the sampling error. The selection of the respondents was conducted using a simple random sampling technique. The key informants were selected purposively.

For 0.95 confidence interval, $e = 0.05$; therefore for the population of 350, the sample size was calculated as follows.

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{350}{1+350(0.05)^2} \quad n = \frac{350}{1+0.87}$$

$$n = 187 \text{ Respondents}$$

3.3.1 Target Population

The target population of the study was 350 respondents which was a number that the researcher estimated to be manageable in order to determine the validity and reliability of the study using Yamanes' (1967) formula of sample determination.

3.4 Sampling Procedures

A sample according to Kothari (2012) is a selection/sub-group of a given Number of members from the accessible population to be representatives of the whole population. Roscoe (1975) in his rule of thumb determination argues that in social sciences research, any number of respondents between 50 and 500 is sufficient to give credible results of the study. The study largely employed both probable (simple random) and non-probable (purposive) sampling procedures in order to gather the correct information from the target population. Purposive sampling was particularly selected as it is a judgmental sampling technique whereby samples are selected on the presumption that they would satisfy the research objectives (White, 2002). There was a deliberate purpose of focusing on mainly those who would give useful information needed for the study.

3.4.1 Sample Size

Kothari (2012) explains that the sample size refers to the number of items to be selected from the universe to constitute a sample which ordinarily should not be too large or too small but should be optimum. The sample size was determined by Yamanes (1967) method of sample size determination. Out of the 187 questionnaires distributed to the respondents, 180 were returned accounting for a 96.3% response rate.

Table 1: Sampling Plan: Simple Random and Purposive Sampling

No	Categories of respondents	No. of the selected respondents	Sampling method used	Percentage
1	Security Officers			
	UPDF	5	Purposive	3
	Immigration Department	5	Simple random	3
	Anti-Terrorism personnel	5	Purposive	3
	Police CID department	5	Purposive	3
	Private Security Organization	5	Simple random	3
2	KCCA Security Department	5	Simple random	3
3	Church/Mosque Leadership (COU, Pentecostal and Muslim)	20	Purposive	11
4	Hotel and Restaurants Managers, Night Clubs	23	Purposive	12
5	Market Managers	10	Purposive	6
6	Community Members	100	Simple random	53
	Total	187		100%

3.4.2 Sampling Techniques

The researcher utilized both purposive and simple random sampling techniques in the study.

3.4.2.1 Purposive Sampling

Purposive sampling, also known as judgmental, selective, or subjective sampling, is a type of non-probability sampling technique. This technique was mainly chosen in order to select a case that was the best to enable the researcher to explore the research topic in depth because of their knowledge of the topic under study. Non-probability sampling focuses on sampling techniques where the units that are investigated are based on the judgment of the researcher.

3.4.2.2 Simple Random sampling

A simple random sample is one in which each member of the population has an equal and independent chance of being included in the random sample. (Fraenkel and Wallen, 2006). This was chosen because it allowed the selection of participants from a population where every person had an equal chance of being included in the sample and where the composition of the sample cannot be predicted in order to avoid generating biased results which may not serve the purpose

of the study. This method was used in Kampala City where there are different categories of people using the general questionnaire administered to the respondents. The study primarily used the purposive sampling technique for the selected key informants. The intention for random sampling was to provide equal chance to every member of the population to participate in the study. The purposive technique helped to generate specific information from Key participants who were selected to be included in the sample because of their Knowledge in the topic of study. These Key participants assisted in providing in-depth information for the study. While simple random method helped to reduce bias in selecting samples hence providing the targeted population with an equal chance to be included in the sample for the study. The two methods were applied in Kampala area. As earlier on stated above purposive and simple random methods were selected because it enabled the researcher to explore the research topic in depth because of their knowledge of the topic under study and to give chance to every person to have an equal chance of being included in the sample.

3.5 Data Collection

Goodwin and Woodsfield (2006) define data collection as the activity of acquiring and compiling information from different sources.

3.6 Data Collection Methods

Primary data was collected using, **self-administered questionnaires** because of the anticipated busy nature of the respondents. Many participants and other stake holders needed some time to give their considered opinions. Semi-structured questionnaires were used to collect primary data because they would accommodate both closed and open-ended questions as suggested by Amin, (2005). Secondary data collection involved obtaining literature from various secondary sources in both electronic and print forms.

3.6.1 Key Informant Interviewing (KII)

This was useful where key personnel were interviewed while using the question guide generated by the researcher to enrich the study. The advantages to this technique are that it provides a free-exchange of ideas, and lends itself to asking more complex questions and getting more detailed responses. This was done through physical interface between the researcher and the key informants. These included senior security officers, church leaders, and managers of hotels among others.

3.6.2 Focus Group Discussions

The study selected four different groups of people with similar experiences ranging from 6 to 8 and interviewed them together with an attempt to gather broader and different views on terrorism and its prevention. This method was particularly selected because it helped to gather persons who had something in common which was connected to the research topic and the researcher was able to take elaborate notes which helped to enrich the research topic. During these interview sessions, the researcher was able to internalize and examine these views and draw conclusions from these discussions

3.6.3 Observation

This involved physical presence of the researcher at certain points of interest related to the study objectives. It also helped to obtain first hand impression of crime prevention activities in the selected places and relevant points were noted as the researcher observed things as they happened, for example access control methods and search methods used by security personnel at entry points.

3.6.4 Documentary Review

This included the review and reading of other people's works that is books, Newspapers, parliamentary debates, government statements, court proceedings, journals *Godfrey Olukya (11 July 2010). "2 bomb attacks in Uganda; 20 feared dead". The Associated Press (via The Atlanta Journal-Constitution). Retrieved 12 July 2010*), but of course being careful about their validity and Reliability as well. However, the focus of the study though was based on primary data.

3.7 Data entry and analysis

Processing of data (for analysis) involved four main activities, namely, data coding, data entry and presentation. During data editing, obvious errors were detected and eliminated (e.g. non-response) other errors were checked for included carelessness, non-uniformities in recording answers, eligibilities etc. and during coding, the responses to each question on the completed self-administered questionnaire were categorized and the category given an identification code guided by the code book. During data entry, responses were transferred from the self-administered questionnaire into computer, using a statistical package for social scientists (SPSS version 20) which were used for both data entry and validation.

3.8 Ethical Consideration

The respondents were consulted to give their informed opinions as well as making them aware of the intentions for this study. The respondents were given assurance that they would be protected and all the information that they provided would be kept with at most confidentiality

3.8 Data Quality Control

3.8.1 Validity of Research Instruments

Nitko (1996) defines validity as the degree to which a test measures what it is supposed to measure.

Katebire (2007) reveals that validity is the extent to which data collection instrument collects data that has the traits which the researcher desires to measure.

Validity therefore means the extent to which the quality of such a procedure or an Instrument or tool used in the research is accurate. White (2002) points out that validity is concerned with the idea that the research design chosen fully addresses the research objectives that have to be achieved. The selected Instruments were therefore carefully designed to meet the required results of the specific objectives of the study, pre-tested in order to identify gaps and make adjustments before final deployment for data collection. Guidance from the researcher's supervisor was relevant at ensuring validity of the research instruments chosen for the study.

3.9 Reliability of Research Instruments

According to Niko (1996), Reliability of research is about consistency and yielding the same results repeatedly. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) explain reliability as a measure of the degree to which a research instrument yields consistent results or data after repeated trials with minimal errors. A reliable tool is supposed to generate the same results whenever it is applied. Therefore, in this study, the researcher was careful to ensure that the instruments selected for this particular study were pretested before deployment and are believed to have provided reliable information in the researcher's view.

3.10 Validity and Reliability of the Results

Nitko (1996) defines validity as the degree to which a test measures what it is supposed to measure. Katebire (2000) reveals that validity is the extent to which data collection instrument collects data that has the traits which the research desires to measure. Validity therefore means the extent to which the quality of such a procedure or an instrument or tool used in the research is accurate. White (2000) points out that validity is concerned with the idea that the research

design chosen fully addresses the research objectives that have to be achieved. The selected instruments were therefore carefully designed to meet the required results of the specific objectives of the study, pre-tested in order to identify gaps and make adjustments before final deployment for data collection. The validity and reliability of the results were tested using the Content Validity Index (CVI), and the product of the test for which the Cronbach's Alpha was 0.634. This indicates that the results were reliable since the product of a good research should be ≥ 0.06 . (See end of chapter four)

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents results of the analyzed data to meet the study objectives and provides possible answers to the study problem. Presentation of findings is provided in form of frequency tables, graphs, pie charts as shown in this chapter. The analysis was done on data from different sets of tools which included, the questionnaire administered to residents of Kampala, Focus group discussion, observations and interview with key security personnel, immigration officers, church leaders, hotel managers, bar managers and other stakeholders.

4.1 Socio Demographic factors of the Respondents

The study considered the socio-demographic factors of the respondents. The demographic features of the respondents are the various attributes associated with the distribution of Gender, age, marital status and educational level of the respondents.

4.1.1 Gender of the Respondents

The study considered only two types of gender; that's male and female as seen in table 2.

Table 2: Gender of the Respondents. N=180

Variable	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Male	98	54.40	54.40	54.40
Valid Female	82	45.6	45.6	100.0
Total	180	100.0	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

Most of the responses were drawn from the male respondents compared to the females because the males were readily available and easy to work with during the conduct of the study. It can be observed that out of the total responses recorded, 54.4% (n= 98 respondents) were from males while only 45.6% (n=82) were female respondents. The male were more approachable than the females and were willing to participate in the study because they also wished to learn from the research process compared to the females who claimed to have household responsibilities to take care of. The structuring of the gender was aimed at obtaining results that were not biased and thus considered an almost equal number of female to male ratio, given that terrorism affects both male and female alike.

4.1.2 Age of Respondents

The field study was carried out on respondents above the age of 18 years. Their ages were grouped into five with an interval of 7 years and the analysis of their responses is shown in figure 1 below.




Figure 2: Age categorizations of Respondents

The respondents who participated in this study ranged from between 18 to 25 years and those in the older age category were between 50 years and above. From figure one, majority of the respondents were in the age categories of 34-41 years followed by 26-33 years. The other respondents were in the categories of between 18-25 and those between 50 years and above, while the least category of participants was in the age category of 42-49 years. The author therefore confirms that the selection of these respondents was good enough to generate good, valid and accurate results. While it can be seen that most respondents were 41 years downwards, one can quickly infer on the choice of respondents to the fact that during the twin bombings of Ethiopian restaurant and Kyandondo Rugby ground, the majority of the people affected were mostly youthful at the time. Meaning that the people who are mostly vulnerable to terror attacks and other crimes are the young people who are active and frequent places of social gathering and constitute more than 75% of the population of the country.

4.1.3 Marital Status of the Respondents

The researcher sought to find out the marital status of the respondents and the findings are presented in table3.

Table 3: Marital status of Respondents, N=180

Variables	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Single	74	41.2	41.2	41.2
Married	82	45.5	45.5	86.7
Valid Separated	16	8.8	8.8	95.5
Divorced	8	4.5	4.5	100.0
Total	180	100	100.0	

The study took to various marital statuses including the singles, married, the separated and the divorced. Of these, 41.2% (n=74) were single, 45.5% (n=82) were married, 8.8% (n=16) were separated and only 4.5% (n=8) were divorced. The married respondents formed the largest number of participants, as seen from table 3 above. Other than the divorced respondents, the combined cumulative percent of the singles, married and separated alone was 95.5% indicating that these were the ones who gave the most responses for the study. From table 3, it can be observed that married people are always the most likely to be affected when a terrorist act takes probably because of fear that they may lose their children who may be caught in the terror incidents and may either get killed or get permanent injuries. Hence pain and trauma associated with the incident and loss of hope for the future which they see in their children.

Level of education of the despondent




Figure 3: Level of Education of the Respondents

(Source: Primary Data)

From figure 3 above, it can be observed that the majority of the respondents (55%) had studied up to tertiary level, 26.25% had reached secondary school, 13.75% had reached primary level of education while only 5% preferred not to mention. The number of the respondents who had reached primary level and those who preferred not to mention was too low and the fact that the majority of the respondents were tertiary graduates, is an affirmation that the results of this study are reliable and relevant. This was relevant because respondents had varied education levels and some needed interpretation before answering. Secondly the educated people understand what security is and what it means to the economic growth and production of the country and also what security means to the life of the people.

4.2 Different roles played by security organs in countering terrorism activities in Uganda.

The researcher sought information from the respondents on the different roles played by security organs in countering terrorism activities in Uganda.

Table 4: Roles of security agencies in minimizing terrorism threats in Uganda, N=180

Variables	Multiple Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
Access control, in public environments such as hotels, bars, schools, government institutions etc	96	19.9%	53.3%
Adequate deployment of security personnel	118	24.4%	65.6%
Surveillance by intelligence agencies	97	20.1%	53.9%
Patrols (motorized and Non-motorized)	121	25.1%	67.2%
Training of security personnel and community policing	51	10.6%	28.3%
Total	483	100.0%	268.3%

Table 4 shows the roles played by security agencies in the reduction of terrorism activities in Uganda. Respondents were given the opportunity to respond on a variety of variables in multiple responses and they gave their views as follows. The highest percentage of the respondents (25.1%, n=121) revealed that security agencies in Uganda undertake responsibilities pertaining to patrolling in either motorized vehicles or non-motorized. The study found out that conducting motorized and non-motorized patrols especially with uniformed security officers, is a deterrent to people who would like to engage in criminal activities including terrorism. The respondents, (24.4% n=118) reported that these departments adequately deploy security personnel in various corners of the country. In the researchers' opinion, this is a small percentage compared to the total number of respondents who were interviewed to give responses on that variable. This is because during the conduct of the study, it was observed that most of the public places lacked adequate deployment of security personnel. On the other hand, 20.1% (n=97) reported of surveillance being carried out by the security agencies. The study found out that most of the local people do not know the modus operandi of the intelligence agencies and therefore could not give enough views on that particular matter. In an in-depth interview with the respondents, only 10.6% (n=51) revealed that security agencies undertake training of security personnel. The study

revealed that even those that have been given sufficient training tend to take up office jobs and they leave most of the activities to their junior staff and some are transferred to areas which are not directly connected to their areas of specialized training obtained. The study revealed that securities agencies concentrate much on patrols (motorized and non-motorized) and conduct surveillance activities most especially after a security threat has been received. It was also found out that security agencies tend to be very active immediately in the after math of an incident and tend to relax afterwards. Access control involving regular checkups at entry points in public environments such as hotels, bars, schools, hospitals and other public institutions is also undertaken. This is supported by only 19.9% (n=96) of the respondents which is unexpectedly small response, considering the level of the threats which are likely to occur in public environments.

Table 5: Roles of Other stakeholders in minimizing terrorism threats in Uganda; N=180

Variables	Multiple Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
Sharing information with security agencies by reporting criminal activities.	46	12.0%	28.9%
Neighborhood watch	140	36.5%	88.1%
Sensitization through Media houses	87	22.7%	54.7%
Others	111	28.9%	69.8%
Total	384	100.0%	241.5%

The study investigated the roles that other stake holders play in supporting the security agencies towards minimizing potential threats of terrorism in the country. The major stakeholders who are involved in participating in the fight against terrorism include; the Directorate of Immigration, Customs Department, private security organizations, media houses, the public among others. Among the variables studied, 36.5% (n=140) of the respondents reported that communities are capable of having neighborhood watch among themselves while 28.9% (n=111) reported of sensitization being done by media houses and the police through community policing programs. A small number of the respondents (12.0%, n=46) said that local communities are able to share information with security agencies by reporting criminal activities. From table 5, it can be confirmed that security agencies cannot perform policing activities by themselves and the fact that other stakeholders can come in to assist their work is an indication of collaborative and collective responsibility between the local communities and these security institutions.

Table 6: Should Security agencies collect, receive and process internal and external intelligence data on the security situation in the country?

Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	28	15.6	15.6
Neutral	38	21.1	36.7
Agree	50	27.8	64.4
Strongly agree	64	35.6	100.0
Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

In table 6 , the findings of the study reveal that over half (63.4%) of the respondents agreed that Security agencies should be able to collect, receive and process internal and external intelligence data on the security situation in the country, 21.1% were neutral while the remaining 15.6% strongly disagreed. This implies that one of the roles of security is to collect, receive and process internal and external intelligence on the security situation in the country which is a mandate given to intelligence agencies in the country such as ESO, ISO , CMI and the Crime Intelligence unit of the Uganda Police. This is very important because it gives confidence to the citizens of the country that security agencies are in charge of the security of the state and ensuring their safety to go about their normal duties without fear of any harm.

Table 7: Responses on maintenance of law and order by security agencies

Responses	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Neutral	26	14.4	14.4
Agree	108	60.0	74.4
Strongly Agree	46	25.6	100.0
Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

The study investigated deeper to obtain responses on whether security agencies maintain law and order in society as seen in table 7. Of the 180 respondents a majority 60.0% agreed, while 14.4% of the respondents were neutral. This implies that respondents feel the security agencies maintain law and order and security in society which is in accordance with the mandate given to them within the 1995 constitution of the Republic of Uganda and also under articles 209 of the UPDF Act, and 212 of the Uganda Police and the security organization’s Act of November 13th 1987. But the researcher still has some reservations as to whether law and order is effectively maintained in the country given the fact that there have been as many as a number of criminal activities in the country in the recent past.

Table 8: Responses on whether security agencies effectively combat and prevent crime in Uganda

Response	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	5	2.8	2.8	2.8
Disagree	7	3.9	3.9	6.7
Neutral	26	14.4	14.4	21.1
Agree	87	48.3	48.3	69.4
Strongly Agree	55	30.6	30.6	100.0
Total	180	100.0	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

The findings of the study show that 69.4% of the respondents agreed that prevention and combating of terrorist crimes is effectively being carried out by security agencies in Uganda. 14.4% were neutral while the remaining 6.7% disagreed and therefore this implies that there is trust in the ability of security agencies to combat and prevent crime in Uganda. The other percentages represent those who are either not sure or still see some gaps and challenges among security agencies in the fight against terrorism in the country.

Table 6: Correlation between level of training and Access control in public environments

	Access control, in public environments such as hotels, bars, schools etc	Level of training of security personnel
Spearman's rho	Correlation Coefficient	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	-.079
	N	.
	Correlation Coefficient	.291
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.029
	N	.291
	180	180

From table 9 above, access control as one of the variables under study was tested against level of training in order to obtain their relationship and to determine the effectiveness of security agencies. The study found out that there is a positive correlation between access control and level

of training (Sig. 0.029, 2-tailed). This means that level of training of the security personnel and access control move in the same direction.

Table 7: Coefficients on access control: Regression Analysis

Model	Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	4.75	.408		1.13	.003
Access control in public environments.	3.21	.686	.490	2.78	.040

a. Dependent Variable: Effectiveness of security agencies.

A linear regression analysis was done to obtain the contribution of access control towards the effectiveness of security agencies in Uganda. The variable was tested at 5% level of significance (95% confidence interval) and the results are shown in table 10. It was found out that access control as one of the mechanisms of minimizing terrorist threats is significant (Sig = 0.04). It can be seen from table 10 by looking at the **B** column under the un-standardized coefficients that the regression equation can be written as follows: Access control in public environments = 4.75 + 3.21. The positive correlation implies that access control impacts significantly on the effectiveness of security agencies in the country.

Table 8: Model Summary in Regression Analysis on Effectiveness of security Agencies

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.513 ^a	.263	.2634	5.140

a. Predictors: (Constant), Level of training of security personnel, Access control Surveillance by intelligence agencies, and Patrols (motorized and Non-motorized)

The study further examined the contribution of several variables towards the effectiveness of security agencies in doing their work as seen in table 11. The results predict variations in the contributions between level of training, access control, and surveillance by intelligence agencies. It can be shown that the R (R= 0.513) was obtained, meaning that all these variables tested contribute only 51% to the effectiveness of the security sector and the remaining percentage is explained by other factors.

Table 9: Coefficients on determinants of the effectiveness of security agencies

Model	Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.767	.215		8.228	.004
1 Surveillance by intelligence agencies	4.64	5.06		1.34	.061
Patrols (motorized and Non-motorized)	2.15	.779	0.47	3.45	.061
Level of training of security personnel	6.24	.896	.456	3.56	0.07

a. Dependent Variable: Effectiveness of security agencies.

Table 10: ANOVA^a

Model	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	.459	3	.153	5.756	.004 ^b
Residual	35.652	176	.203		
Total	36.111	179			

a. Dependent Variable: Effectiveness of Security agencies.

b. Predictors: (Constant), Level of training of security personnel, Surveillance by intelligence agencies, Patrols (motorized and Non-motorized)

Table 12 and 13 provide us with information predictor variables which determine the effectiveness of security agencies in Uganda. A linear regression analysis was performed using SPSS20.0 to examine the influence of access control, level of training, surveillance by intelligence personnel and patrols (motorized and non-motorized). The relationship between these variables was significant with a correlation coefficient, (R = 0.513, p=0.004<0.05).

4.3 The existing security gaps contributing to the perpetration of terrorism crimes in Uganda.

In this section the study sought to find out the existing security gaps contributing to the perpetration of terrorism crimes in Uganda and the responses from the respondents are shown in the tables below.

Table 14: Responses on whether there are existing gaps in the fight against terrorism in Uganda

Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	9	5.0	5.0
Disagree	4	2.2	7.2
Neutral	23	12.8	20.0
Agree	64	35.6	55.6
Strongly agree	80	44.4	100.0
Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

The table 14 shows that majority (80%) of the respondents cumulatively agreed that there are gaps in the fight against terrorism in Uganda. Among these, 12.8% were neutral, and 5.0% strongly disagreed while the remaining 2.2% disagreed. This implies that there are still gaps in the fight against terrorism in Uganda and these gaps might have been a potential cause for the 2010 twin bombings in Kampala.

Table 15: Major Gaps which need to be addressed by security agencies in minimizing terrorism threats in Uganda

Variables	Multiple Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
Porous Borders	132	25.8%	74.6%
Laxity of security personnel	100	19.6%	56.5%
Ignorance of the people	113	22.1%	63.8%
Inadequate corporation between security agencies	96	18.8%	54.2%
Weak immigration laws	70	13.7%	39.5%
Total	511	100.0%	288.7%

Table 15 shows major gaps that need to be addressed by security agencies in the reduction of terrorism activities in Uganda. It was revealed that while it can be much easy to deal with local challenges such as the ones mentioned above, a number of gaps still exist. The study found out that Uganda's borders are very porous. This was supported by 25.8% (n=132) respondents who

were in agreement with this issue. The study revealed that the weaknesses in Uganda's border security may allow terrorists to not only get into the country but also to smuggle in weapons they need to attack their targets in the country.

While it is easy to assert that every country has got strict security at its borders to check and restrict or prohibit entry and exit of criminals, it is very worrying that Uganda's entry and exit terminals are not well secured. Security of entry and exit routes is one of the fundamental aspects of a country's growth and development determinants. This therefore means that for any country to propel its development agenda, it must get prepared to safeguard itself from external enemies. The study can therefore confirm that most terrorism threats in the country are linked to the porous nature of both entry and exit routes which terrorists take advantage of.

In an in-depth interview and focus group discussions with the respondents, it was revealed that ignorance of the people about potential threats of terrorism activity is still a major issue. Some of the respondents (22.1%, n=113) said that local people seem not to be very much unaware of how terrorists operate. The findings reveal that most common people find it very difficult to differentiate between themselves and terrorists most especially when they go into public places, for example to dine, entertainment and even travel. 18.8 % pointed out Ignorance of the people about the acts of terrorism whereby a large percentage of the people are not aware of the dangers of terrorism and their implications. Local people tend not to have a clear picture of who a terrorist is, and how they look like whereby they think terrorists are only Somalis, Arabs or colored people, forgetting the fact that any person including Ugandan nationals could be a potential terrorist. While having in-depth interviews with the respondents, the study found out that among the people who were involved in the July 11, 2010 Bombings, some Ugandan nationals were also involved and even confessed to have participated in the preparation and execution of the mission after their arrests.

Other gaps included laxity of security personnel (19.6%, n=100) most especially relaxing while on duty, lack of proper access control and screening of persons and luggage. It was revealed by respondents that security agencies tend to be more active when an incident has occurred but tend to relax when the situation normalizes, forgetting the fact that terrorists don't relax in their endeavor to accomplish their set missions. Other gaps include inadequate corporation between security agencies (18.8%, n= 96) and weak immigration laws (13.7%, n= 70). The latter two

were viewed as being attended to lightly. From this study, it can be confirmed that the 2010 terrorist attacks in Uganda were partly attributed to the porous borders and weak immigration laws, as many of the suspects caught were foreigners from Somalia and Kenya and other countries who were illegally living in Uganda unchallenged by the authorities.

4.4 Challenges faced by security agencies in the fight against terrorism in Uganda.

There are a number of challenges that the study found out and these have been discussed as follows.

4.4.1 The Challenge Relating to Intelligence Gathering

The researcher sought to find out whether there are other challenges in the area relating to intelligence gathering and the findings are presented below.

Table 16: Are there any challenges relating to intelligence gathering?

	Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Strongly Disagree	31	17.2	17.2
	Disagree	24	13.3	30.5
	Neutral	16	8.9	39.4
	Agree	59	32.8	72.2
	Strongly Agree	50	27.8	100.0
	Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

Field findings indicate that a majority (60.6%) of the respondents cumulatively agreed that there are challenges in the area of intelligence gathering, 30.4% disagreed while 8.9% were neutral. This implies that intelligence has challenges and these may have probably contributed to the twin bombings in Kampala in 2010, as well as other criminal activities that are happening in the country without prior knowledge of the security agencies.

4.4.2 The challenge Posed by Human Rights Defenders/Organizations

The researcher sought to find out whether there are challenges posed by human rights/organizations and the findings are presented here below.

Table 17: Is there any challenge posed by human rights defenders/Organizations?

	Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Strongly Disagree	24	13.3	13.3
	Disagree	49	27.2	40.6
	Neutral	11	6.1	46.7
	Agree	31	17.2	63.9
	Strongly Agree	65	36.1	100.0
	Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

The findings in table 17 indicate that a significant majority (63.9%) of the respondents agreed that there is a challenge posed by human rights defenders/Organizations in the fight against terrorism, 40.6% disagreed to the assertion. The implication is that human rights organizations may be an impediment to the fight against terrorism because they frustrate government efforts to fight terrorism by demanding that all terrorism suspects be produced before courts of law within 48hours of the arrest as stipulated by Article 23 (4b) of the Constitution of the republic of Uganda of 1995 even when investigations of the case are still going on.

4.4.3 Findings about the challenge of lack of proper tools and modern equipment for security agencies

The researcher sought to find out whether the lack of proper tools and modern equipment for security agencies to use in countering terrorism in Uganda is a challenge in the fight against terrorism and the findings are presented in table 18.

Table 18: Is there a lack of proper tools and modern equipment for security agencies?

	Responses	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Strongly Disagree	53	29.4	29.4
	Disagree	34	18.9	48.3
	Neutral	27	15.0	63.3
	Agree	12	6.7	70.0
	Strongly Agree	54	30.0	100.0
	Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

Table 18 shows that 30.0 % of the respondents strongly agreed that the lack of proper tools and equipment for security agencies is a challenge to the security agencies, 29.4% strongly disagreed, 18.9% disagreed, 15% were neutral while 6.7% agreed. This implies that to a certain extent the

lack of tools and equipment for security agencies to do their work was a challenge that could have resulted in the twin bombings in Kampala and other crimes happening elsewhere in the country. It also means that there are other underlying factors preventing security agencies to effectively fight against general crime in the country including terrorism given that budgetary allocation to defense and security are always higher than other sectors in the Country. This perception was hinted on by some respondents who noted that: *“Defense is always better funded than other sectors in every budget year; they have the equipment but like to use them only in special circumstances.”*

4.4.4 Inadequate training of the security agencies

The research sought to find out whether inadequate training of the security agencies was a challenge and the findings are presented in table 19.

Table 20: Is the inadequate training of the security agencies a challenge?

Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	14	7.8	7.8
Disagree	19	10.6	18.3
Neutral	18	10.0	28.3
Agree	64	35.6	63.9
Strongly Agree	65	36.1	100.0
Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

The field findings reveal that majority 63.9 % agreed that inadequate training of the security agencies is a challenge in the fight against terrorism in Kampala, 18.3% disagreed to the assertion while the remaining 10.0 % were neutral. This suggests that the lack of adequate training is a challenge as a handful of security personnel have undergone specialized training in the field of counter terrorism while the rest are half-baked. Others even do not know how explosives look like and how suicide bombers carry their bomb which therefore implies that the public is vulnerable if people who they have entrusted the security of their lives and property are also green about these things.

4.4.5 The Challenge of political interference by politicians in the operations of security agencies

The researcher sought to find out whether there is a challenge of political interference by politicians in the operations of security agencies and the findings are presented in table 21.

Table 21: Is there a challenge of political interference by politicians in the operations of security agencies?

Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	19	10.6	10.6
Disagree	33	18.3	28.9
Neutral	36	20.0	48.9
Agree	80	44.4	93.3
Strongly agree	12	6.7	100.0
Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

Table shows that of the 180 respondents, 44.4% agreed that there is political interference by politicians in the operations of security agencies, 20.0% were neutral, 18.3% disagreed, and 10.6% strongly disagreed while the remaining 6.7% strongly agreed. The implication of this is that political interference by politicians in the operations of security agencies is a challenge in the fight against terrorism in Uganda. An example is that during the debate on the Regulation of Interception of Communications Bill (2007) which had been introduced three years earlier, and was withdrawn for “further consultations” after resistance from Members of Parliament. Members of Parliament were especially uncomfortable with the powers the proposed law granted to the Security Minister. Since its introduction, the then Security Minister had argued that with the threat of terrorism and sophisticated crime, government needed a system of monitoring communication to avert terrorism and other forms of high crimes., Members of Parliament expressed their concerns that the law if passed would empower government to act against its political enemies by labeling them as terrorists. This was raised despite the fact that the Bill was presented by government as an efficient way to fight terrorism in the country.

4.4.6 Lack of cooperation from the public on security matters

The researcher sought to find out whether the lack of cooperation among public about security matters is a challenge in the fight against terrorism in Uganda.

Table 22: Is there any lack of cooperation on security matters?

Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	15	8.3	8.3
Disagree	17	9.4	17.8
Neutral	109	60.6	78.3
Agree	20	11.1	89.4
Strongly agree	19	10.6	100.0
Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary data

Table 22 reveals that majority 60.6% of the respondents were neutral on the perception of the public about security matters, 11.1% Agreed, 10.6% strongly agreed, 9.4% disagreed while the remaining 8.3% strongly disagreed. This implies a lack of understanding among the respondents about the perception of the public on security matters given that majority of the respondents were neutral. This is a consequence of inadequate sensitization of majority of the public on issues related to security. Many Ugandans are not security conscious, for example at many supermarkets and malls, entry points in town, people in queues will just look at somebody bypassing them even with bags that may contain dangerous materials and will not complain to the security personnel why such persons are not checked. Others choose not to pass over any information to security for fear of being victimized.

4.4.7 Inadequate funding of security agencies

The researcher sought to investigate whether inadequate funding of security agencies is a challenge in the fights against terrorism in Uganda and the findings are presented in table 23.

Table 23: Inadequate funding of security agencies

Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	20	11.1	11.1
Disagree	21	11.7	22.8
Neutral	28	15.6	38.3
Agree	27	15.0	53.3
Strongly Agree	84	46.7	100.0
Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

Out of the 180 respondents, Inadequate funding of security agencies 61.7% of the respondents agreed, 15.6% were neutral, 11.1% strongly agreed while the remaining 11.1% strongly disagreed. This implies that there is a challenge of funding for the security agencies in Uganda. On most occasions security chiefs in the country have had to voice their concerns of less funding to their departments which prevents them from effectively equipping their personnel in terms of training and equipment to enable them perform their duties effectively.

4.4.8 Investigating the Challenge of Uganda's open door policy on migration

The researcher sought to know whether Uganda's open door policy on migration was a challenge to the fight against terrorism in Uganda and the findings are presented below.

Table 24: Is Uganda’s open door policy on migration a Security Challenge?

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative percentage
Disagree	15	8.3	8.3
Neutral	32	17.8	26.1
Agree	16	8.9	35.0
Strongly Agree	117	65.0	100.0
Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

On whether Uganda’s open door policy is a security challenge, 65% of the total respondents strongly agreed, 17.8% were neutral, 8.9% agreed while 8.3% disagreed. It can therefore be said that Uganda’s open door policy on migration is a challenge that may lead to terrorist attacks given that every Tom, Dick and Harry can easily come in and live the country with less serious challenges at the border posts and within the country itself. This was also echoed during the interview by some respondents who asserted that: *“The problem we have is that, our border points are not tight which makes it easy for the wrong doers to enter this country easily”*.

4.4.9 Challenge posed by the operations of private security organizations in the fights against potential threats of terrorism.

The researcher wanted to find out the challenges posed by the operations of private security organizations in the fights against potential threats of terrorism and the findings are presented below.

Table 25: Is there any challenge posed by the operations of private security organizations in the fights against potential threats of terrorism in Uganda?

Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	17	9.4	9.4
Disagree	26	14.4	23.9
Neutral	6	3.3	27.2
Agree	8	4.4	31.7
Strongly agree	123	68.3	100.0
Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

Table 25 shows that majority 68.3% of the respondents strongly agreed that there is a challenge posed by the operations of private security organizations in the fight against potential threats of terrorism in Uganda, 14.4% disagreed, 9.4% strongly disagreed, 4.4% agreed while the remaining 3.3% were neutral. The implication of this is that private security agencies see it as not part of their role to assist in the fight against terrorism activities in the country. This is because

they are being employed by private firms hence they imagine that their security duties are confined within the parameters set by their employers and also the issue of inadequate training is a challenge as majority of them are civilians with rudimentary training given to them before embarking on their work. No wonder, documentary review from Opolot (2016) a security strategist in Uganda states that One of the basic functions of a state is to guarantee and provide security and protection to her citizens, but when this fundamental function is seemingly relegated and left in the hands of private and profit-motivated security companies, then the State is either in the verge of absconding from her cardinal duty of providing public security. This in essence makes the citizens susceptible to all sorts of threats emanating from inadequate or lack of professional security training often associated with the private security guards in the country. Public peace and security in the hands of ill-trained private security guards amounts to betrayal by those constitutionally mandated to have a monopoly for the use and application of weapons of violence.

Table 26: Challenges faced by security agencies in minimizing terrorism threats in Uganda

Variables	Multiple Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
Corruption within the immigration department (especially passport control and security)	155	19.9%	86.1%
Low remuneration	70	9.0%	38.9%
Inadequate funding of security agencies	45	5.8%	25.0%
Low level of Staffing	58	7.4%	32.2%
Low level of Motivation among security staff	164	21.0%	91.1%
Political interference	77	9.9%	42.8%
Lack of modern surveillance equipment	145	18.6%	80.6%
Gun Smuggling due to porous Borders	66	8.5%	36.7%
Total	780	100.0%	433.3%

Table 26 shows the roles played by security agencies in their efforts to minimize terrorism activities in Uganda. The study reveals that security agencies face a lot of challenges and among these, it was reported that low level of motivation (21.0% n=164) among security staff is the biggest challenge. This is followed by corruption within the immigration department where non-

Ugandans easily acquire Ugandan passports most especially west African nationals (19.9%, n=155) and lack of modern surveillance equipment (18.6%, n=145) for the security staff to perform their tasks. On the one hand the study reveals that low motivation and corruption within the immigration department (especially passport control) and law enforcement is mainly caused by the meager remuneration partnered with the socio-economic demands of the security agencies. On the other hand, the lack of sufficient surveillance equipment is explain by the fact that security agencies are allocated a small vote from the national budget which is usually not adequate to finance purchase of required surveillance equipment and to support other surveillance programs. The analysis shows that low remuneration appeared to be under looked by the respondents yet in the researcher’s opinion; it could be one of the major contributing factors to all of the above mentioned issues. Much as it was expected prior to the study that gun smuggling due to porous borders would be a serious challenge, the study revealed to the contrary. This therefore is an indication that the respondents over looked that issue yet in the researchers opinion, porous borders can be serious entry points for illegal immigrants and importation of prohibited items such as guns, explosives, ammunition, among others.

4.4.10 Gauging the preparedness of Uganda security organs to guard against potential threats of terrorism

The researcher sought to gauge the preparedness of Uganda security organs to guard against terrorism and the findings are presented and discussed in the following table.

Table 27: Preparedness of Uganda security organs

Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Very poor	5	2.8	2.8
Poor	5	2.8	5.6
Fair	100	55.6	61.1
Good	47	26.1	87.2
Very Good	23	12.8	100.0
Total	180	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

The findings of the study indicated that a slight majority of 55.6% of the respondent’s gauged Uganda security preparedness as fair, 26.1% said good, 12.8% very good while the remaining 5.2% respondents disagreed, citing poor preparedness of the security organs to guard against acts of terrorism. This shows the various perceptions the people have about the security organs in Uganda in dealing with terrorism and this may be due to the fact that much as no major terrorist

activity has taken place in the country since the twin bombings at Kyadondo and Ethiopian village, the fact that there have been continuous terror threats and some arrests of suspected terrorists could explain the various responses by the respondents.

4.5 Validity and Reliability of the Results

Table 28: Case Processing Summary for Validity and Reliability Test

		N	%
Cases	Valid	180	100.0
	Excluded ^a	0	.0
	Total	180	100.0

- a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

Table 11: Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.634	23

From tables 29 and 30, the variables were tested for validity and reliability using the Content Validity index and a Cronbach's alpha of 0.634 was obtained.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary, conclusion, and recommendations of the study.

5.1 Summary of Findings

The study investigated the effectiveness of security agencies and other stake holders in the fight towards minimizing potential threats of terrorism in Uganda. Among the variables that were studied as key determinants are given as follows;

Objective one: To examine different roles played by security organs and other stakeholders in countering terrorism activities in Uganda.

Access control in public places such as hotels, bars, schools, government institutions etc, training of security personnel, surveillance by intelligence agencies, patrols (motorized and non-motorized), deployment of security personnel among others. The findings revealed a positive relationship between the variables studied and the effectiveness of security agencies.

The most effective activities carried out are patrols (motorized and non-motorized)(25.1%, N=121), regular deployment of uniformed security personnel, surveillance by intelligence agencies(20.1% N=97). Access control involving regular checkups at entry points in public environments such as hotels, bars, schools, hospitals and other public institutions are being done regularly and it was observed as the stricter mechanism among all the variables under investigation(19.9% N=96).

Objective two: To find out the existing security gaps contributing to the perpetration of terrorism crimes in Uganda.

Much as security stakeholders are trying to do their level best in ensuring peace and security in the country prevails, there still exist some gaps which still need to be addressed as revealed in the study variables. This includes laxity of security personnel while on duty (19.6%, N=100), porous borders (25.8%, N=132), lack of cooperation among security agencies (18.8%, N=96), Weak immigration laws against migrants (13.7%, N=70) among others.

Objective three: To identify challenges faced by security agencies in the fight against terrorism in Uganda.

The major challenges facing security agencies were identified as follows, low level of motivation among security staff(21%, N=164), corruption within the immigration department (especially passport control office) and the security agencies(19.9%, N=155), lack of modern surveillance equipment(18.6%, N=146), gun smuggling due to porous borders(8.5%, N=66), political interference by those in political offices(9.9%, N=77), and low level of Staffing(7.4%, N=58), inadequate funding of security agencies(5.8%, N=45), low remuneration among others(9.0%, N=70).

Other stakeholders as well contribute significantly to the effectiveness of security of Uganda through sensitization by media houses through press and print(22.7%, N=87) neighborhood watch by the citizens(36.5%, N=140) and sharing of information with security agencies by reporting criminal activities(12%, N=46).

5.2 Conclusion

Conclusively therefore, one can say that security agencies in Uganda still have an uphill task in as far as effectiveness in providing security to the lives and property of the citizens is concerned. Threats of terrorism activities still exist as well as other crimes which threaten lives of the citizens of Uganda and need to be addressed through closing gaps. The roles of different security organs are well articulated in the constitution of Uganda (1995) as amended. Nevertheless, there still exist some gaps that hamper the effectiveness of the security agencies in execution of their mandate to protect the state, lives and property of Ugandans against threats of terrorism. Security agencies also apparently are still faced with numerous challenges which range from inadequate funding, training, lack of proper coordination among themselves, under staffing and funding among many other challenges. Addressing some of these issues by government will go a long way in improving the security situation in the country.

5.3 Recommendations

The study recommended the following;

- a) Inter-agency communication must be encouraged as well as information sharing and cooperation between security organs and other stakeholders so as not to create security gaps which can easily be exploited by people with criminal minds.

- b) Hundred percent strict checks in public environments such as airports, customs, public buildings hotels, borders, must be practiced by all security organs so as to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.
- c) Government and development partners should endeavor to promote social safety net programs among the vulnerable groups who in most cases are a target for recruitments by the criminal minded groups.
- d) Security agencies should technically be adaptive to their security measures to counter the ever changing strategies employed by terrorists-rather than relaying on the old methods of work.
- e) There should be rapid response by security agencies to the threats, incidences by quick follow up of intelligence reports provided and be able to dominate the areas where the incidents has occurred which can lead to faster arrests and prosecution of the culprits.
- f) There is a need for intelligence agencies to up their intelligence gathering skills and techniques by more training from advanced countries who are more knowledgeable in intelligence work.

5.4 Areas for further Research

The study recommended key areas for further researcher;

- (i) The Role of private security agencies in preventing terrorist attacks in Uganda.
- (ii) Investigate the causes of the growing spate of organized killings, kidnaps and robberies that have struck fear across the country.

References

- Andrew P.N. Erdmann (2002). Policy planning, staff remarks to the Gaudino Forum, Williams College, Williams's Bobon, USA
- BBC Focus on Africa (2013). Nairobi siege: How the attack happened Saturday 21 September: around noon local time (09:00GMT), www.bbc.com.
- Beenish Ahmed (2015). *What's The Real Root Cause Of Terrorism: Poverty Or Anger?* Think Progress
- Bell, J. (1999). *Doing your research project: a guide for first-time researchers in education and social science* (3rd ed.). Open University Press, Philadelphia
- Boaz Ganor. (2009) Defining terrorism: Is one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter? ... *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22 (1), 102-119, 2009.
- Bob H and Ross Franklin, (2010). *Research methods, a practical guide for social sciences*, Pearson Education Ltd, Edinburg, England.
- Bogere.M, and Egesa A (2015). *Understanding Research and Statistics Methods*, Smart Solutions Ltd, Kampala-Uganda.
- Burton, Anthony. (1978). *Revolutionary violence: The theories*. Crane, Russak. NY
- Chaliand Gérard and Blin Arnaud (2006). *The history of terrorism from antiquity to Al Qaeda* translated by Edward Schneider, Kathryn Pulver, and Jesse Browner University of California Press Berkeley Los Angeles, USA
- Cohen, J. (2002). *Protestantism and Capitalism: The Mechanisms of Influence*. New York: USA
- Daily Nation, (2016). *Somalia, Amisom to rely more on air strikes As EU Reduces Funding*
- Fain JA, (2004). *Understanding and Applying Nursing Research: 2nd Edition*. F.A Davis, Philadelphia
- Federation of American Scientists (1998). <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/plo.htm>
- Created by John Pike Maintained by Webmaster Updated Saturday, August 08, 19987
- Fraenkel, J.R., & Wallen, N.E. (2006). *How to design and evaluate research in education*. New Freedom Press.

Friedman, R.I. (1992). *Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel's West Bank Settlement Movement*. Published March 1st 1994 by Rutgers University Press, New York.

Fulton, S., Krainovich, Miller, B. (2010). *Gathering and appraising the Literature*, Mosby Elsevierist Louis Mo. USA

Ganor B. (2009). *Trends in Modern International Terrorism: To Protect and To Serve*, 11-42 Springer, New York.USA

Given Lisa M (2008).*Research Justification: The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods* , Claire Ballinger

Global Regime for Terrorism report (2013). *Measuring and Understanding the Impact Terrorism"* (PDF).

Global Terrorism Index (2014). *Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism"*(PDF).Institute for Economics & Peace (published 16 November 2014).

Global Terrorism Index (2015). *Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism"* (PDF). Institute for Economics and Peace (published 17 November 2015). November 2015. ISBN

Godfrey Olukya (11 July 2010).*"2 bomb attacks in Uganda; 20 feared dead"*. The Associated Press (*via* The Atlanta Journal-Constitution). Retrieved 12 July 2010.

Hoffman Bruce (2006). *Inside Terrorism*: Columbia University Press, 2006, Chichester, West Sussex: Colombia.

Hoffman, B. (1993). *"Holy terror": the implications of terrorism motivated by a religious Imperative'* Worldwide Department of Defense Combating Terrorism Conference, Virginia Beach, VA.USA

Horgan, J. (2005). *The psychology of terrorism*. Londres Routledge. Jewish Relations Council, San Francisco. USA

Jeffrey D. Simon (1994) *The Terrorist Trap*, Second Edition. America's Experience with Terrorism. US, ISBN: 978-0-253-21477-5

Jeremy Shapira and Benedicte Suzan (2007). Pgs. 67-98 published on line 27 June 2007)

Busher Joel (2014), *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa*. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, Pages 884-905

- Juergensmeyer, M. (2001). *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. USA
- Kaplan Eben (2006). "Tracking Down Terrorist Financing", available on <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/11>
- Katebire, D. A. (2007). *Social research methodology: An introduction*. Makerere University Printery: Makerere University Kampala
- Kirunda Solomon Wilson (2008). The private security sector in Africa, Country Series, Â Monograph No 146, July 2008.
- Kothari (2012) *Research Methodology*. New Age International Pvt Ltd Publishers (1753) ASIN: B01N9N0JTD, India
- Kraemer, E. (2004). A philosopher looks at terrorism. Pp.113-131 in Nyatepe-Coo, A. & Zeisler-Vralsted, D. (eds.) *Understanding terrorism*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. USA
- Krueger Alan B. MaleckovaJitka (2002). *Education, Poverty, Political violence and Terrorism: is there a Causal connection?: National Bureau of Economic Research 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, USA*
- Kshitij Prabha(2015). *GD Terrorism an Instrument of Foreign Policy: Intl Academic Pub*
- Laqueur Walter (2007). *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, (London: Oxford University Press).
- League of Nations (1937).*Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism*, League of Nations Publications
- Leedy, P. D. (1997). *Practical research: Planning and design (6th Edition)*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Long David (1990). *Extract from Terrorism and Geopolitics by Clay Schrader: VJ Books Longman. Harlow.*
- Lutz James M. and Brenda J. (2008), *Global Terrorism*. London: Routledge, UK
- Martin Ewi. (2013)*The new ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its implications for West Africa*. ISS Pretoria, South Africa
- Matthews Bob, Ross Liz (2010). *Research methods: a practical guide for the social sciences*, 1st ed: Harlow, Essex Pearson Longman. UK

Max Abrahms (2008). What terrorists really want, terrorist motives and counter terrorism strategy, *International Security*, Vol. 32, page(s): 78-105

Medhane Tadesse (2007). IGAD and Ethiopian; A Historical and functional profile, in occasional paper, Vol 9 (25) PP 7-27)

Merari, A. (1990). The readiness to kill and die: suicidal terrorism in the Middle East. In W.Reich (ed.) *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies and states of mind*. Cambridge University Press.

Miller Judith and GerthJeff (2001), A Nation Challenged: AL Qaeda; Honey Trade Said to Provide Funds and Cover to bin Laden, *The New York Times*.

Moten, A. R. (2010). *Understanding terrorism: Contested concept, conflicting perspectives and*

Mugenda, O. M. & Mugenda, A. G. (2003). *Research methods: Quantitative and qualitative Approaches*. Nairobi: African Centre for Technology Studies. Kenya

Napoleoni Loretta, (2016). *Merchants of Men: How Jihadists and ISIS Turned Kidnapping and Refugee Trafficking into a Multi-Billion Dollar* -August 30, 2016

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standard and Goals (1976). *Private security - report of the task force on private security*, National Institute of Justice/, NCJRS paper reproduction.

Nicholas Fotion, (2008). *Terrorism; The New world disorder, continuum international publishers, west court*.

Nitko, A. J, (1996). *Educational Assessment of students*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Merrill. Chicago, USA

Nzai, Munro, (2010). CT in the greater Horn of Africa 2004-2010: Revisiting the Somalian question, *journal of language, Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa* Vol. 2 No. 2.

O'Neill, W, (2002a). Concept paper-beyond the slogans: How can the UN respond to terrorism? *Responding to terrorism: New York: International Peace Academy. Journal of International Law*. 375

O'Neill E, Bard (2002). *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, Second Edition, Revised 2nd Edition New York, USA

Onyango (2003) Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army – DTIC, Foreign Military Studies Office, 731 McClellan Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, USA

Opolot Simon Peter, (2016). New Vision, 16th June 2016

Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 8th Edition: Paperback (2010)

Pain Richard J. (2009). Global issues, politics, Economics & culture 2nd Ed. Pearson Longman, Illinois State University)

Passmore, K. (2002). Fascism: A very short introduction. NY: Oxford University Press. UK

Primoratz, Igor, (2004). What is Terrorism? The philosophical issues. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 15-27. USA

Proudhon Pierre Joseph (1923). "What Is Government?", written in General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century, translated by John Beverly Robinson, London:UK

RAND (2011). RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Retrieved April 6, 2011 from http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism_incidents.html

Rapoport, D.C (1988). Inside Terrorist Organizations, Frank Cass-London, UK

Rapoport. C. David (2004). The Four Waves of Terrorism, – Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy.

Richardson, C. (2011). Relative Deprivation Theory in Terrorism: A Study of Higher Education and Unemployment as Predictors of Terrorism. Unpublished Thesis (Honors), New York University. USA

Richardson, Louise. (2006), What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat, John Murray

Robson Colin (2002). *Real World Research*, 2nd edition, John Willey and sons, Chichester

Ross, L. and B. Matthews (2010). Research Methods: A practical guide for the social sciences.

Sandler.T and Enders, W., (2012). The Political Economy of Terrorism. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Santis Yitzhak (2008). HAMAS: its ideology and record in 2008, updated July 2014

Schmid Alex (2004). Terrorism - The Definitional Problem, New Brunswick, NEW YORK

Schmid, A. P., Albert J. Jongman, A. J. (1988) Political terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories and literature New Brunswick, NJ.

Schmidt .P.A (2004) 'Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism', Terrorism and Political Violence, University Press.

Shinn David (2008). Implications of Terrorism and CT in the Horn of Africa paper delivered at a conference VII Lund, Sweden.

Simon, Jeffrey D. (1994). The Terrorist Trap. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press),

Stitt, B. G. (2003). The understanding of evil: A joint quest for criminology and theology. Pp.203-218 in R. Chairs & B.Chilton (eds.) Star Trek Visions of Law & Justice. Dallas: Adios Press.

Szoldra, Paul (May 11, 2013). "These 17 Agencies Make Up The Most Sophisticated Spy Network In The World".

The Global Terrorism Index of 2015 (2015).Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism. The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), visit www.economicsandpeace.org.

The Guardian (2010), Uganda bomb blasts kill at least 74 Somali Islamist militants claim responsibility for worst attack in east Africa since US embassy bombings in 1998, Monday 12 July.

The Uganda peoples' defense forces Act, 2005

TraynorIan(2007). Russia accused of unleashing cyber war to disable Estonia, The Guardian 17 May 2007

United Nations (2008).Office of the special Advisor on Africa. "Africa and Inter-counter terrorism Imperatives" expert paper prepared by the office of the special advisor on Africa.

United Nations (2012).A report presented to the UN Security Council. Submitted report to the Security Council detailing the LRA's crimes against children. York: Random House.

Wright Lawrence (2007).The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 Paperback – August 21, 2007, Phillips& Nelson Media, IncYork: McGraw-Hill.

Yamane, Taro. (1967). Statistics: An Introductory Analysis, 2nd Edition, New York: Harper and Row.

Zalman, A. (2017). Causes of Terrorism-Why are the Causes of Terrorism So Hard to Identify?.

[Http://terrorism.about.com/od/causes/a/terrorismcauses.html](http://terrorism.about.com/od/causes/a/terrorismcauses.html)

Zimmermann, Ekkart, (2009). Forms of political terrorism: A plea for a differential diagnosis.

Quarterly Journal of Economic Research 78, 4, 11-28.

Appendices

Appendix i: Interview and Focus Group Interview Guide

1. What do you think are the roles played by security agencies in fights against terrorism in Uganda?
2. Are you satisfied with the level of security effectiveness in Uganda in as far as protecting citizens is concerned
3. In your opinion are there security gaps in combating terrorism in Uganda?
4. What are the challenges faced by security in fighting terrorism in Uganda?
5. Suggest some solutions that you think can be adopted for the effective combating of terror threats by security agencies.

Appendix ii: Map of Kampala showing the areas of twin Bombings.



Appendix (iii): Sample Size Determination

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(0.05)^2}$$

Where N = population, n = sample size, $e = (0.05)^2$ = is the sampling error. The selection of the respondents was conducted using a simple random sampling technique. The key informants were selected purposively.

For 0.95 confidence interval, $e = 0.05$; therefore for the population of 350, the sample size was calculated as follows.

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{350}{1+350(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{350}{1+0.87}$$

$$n = 187 \text{ Respondents}$$

Appendix (iv): Self-administered Questionnaire

NKUMBA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

My name is Alomu Timothy, I am a student of Nkumba University, school of social science; carrying out an academic research study on the topic “an assessment of the effectiveness of the security agencies and other stakeholders in Uganda to prevent potential threats of terrorism, a case of Kyadondo rugby club and Ethiopian village restaurant and bar bombings in Kampala, July /11 /2010.” I am kindly requesting for your participation and cooperation to facilitate this study, the findings of this study will purely be used for academic purposes only. Thank you for your corporation.

Yours Truly

Alomu Timothy

SECTION A:

SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS OF THE RESPONDENTS

1. Gender of Respondents

Male Female

2. Age of Respondents

Between 18 -25

Between 26- 33

Between 34 – 41

Between 42-49

Between 50- Above

3. Marital Status of the Respondents

Single

Married

Separated

Divorced

4. Highest Educational Level attained

Primary Level

Secondary Level

University/ Tertiary level

Preferred not to mention

SECTION B: GENERAL INFORMATION:

1. Do you think security agencies play any roles towards minimizing potential threats of terrorism in Uganda?

Yes

No

2. If yes in response to question 5 above, what are the major roles that security agencies play towards minimizing potential threats of terrorism in Uganda?(Multiple Response)

Training of security personnel and community policing

Adequate deployment of security personnel

Surveillance by intelligence agencies

Patrols (motorized and Non-motorized)

Access control, in public environments

Other Specify.....

3. Do you think other stakeholders have a role to play in minimizing potential threats of terrorism in Uganda?

Yes

NO

4. If yes in response to question 7 above, what are the major roles that other stakeholders play towards minimizing potential threats of terrorism in Uganda?

(Multiple Response)

Neighborhood watch

Sensitization through Media houses

Sharing information with security agencies by reporting criminal activities

Other

5. Are there any major gaps which need to be addressed by security agencies in minimizing terrorism threats in Uganda?

Yes

NO

6. If yes in response to question 9, what are the major gaps which need to be addressed by security agencies in minimizing terrorism threats in Uganda?(Multiple Response)

- Porous Borders
- Laxity of security Personnel
- Ignorance of the People
- Weak Immigration laws
- Inadequate Corporation between Security Agencies

7. What are the key challenges faced by security agencies in minimizing terrorism threats in Uganda?(Multiple Response)

- Corruption within the Immigration Department and security
- Low remuneration of security personnel
- Gun Smuggling due to porous Borders
- Low level of Staffing in security
- Low level of Motivation among security staff
- Political interference
- Lack of modern surveillance equipment
- Inadequate funding of security agencies

8. Do you think security agencies should maintain law and order and security in the country

- Strongly Disagree
- Agree
- Neutral
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

9. In your opinion, do you think combating and prevention of crime is effectively carried out by security agencies in Uganda?

- Strongly Disagree
- Agree
- Neutral
- Agree

Strongly Agree

10. In your own opinion, what other roles do you think security agencies should be doing to fight against potential threats of terrorism?

.....
.....

11. How do you gauge the preparedness of Uganda's security agencies in minimizing the potential terrorist threats?

- Very poor
- Poor
- Fair
- Good
- Very Good

THANK YOUR FOR YOUR CO-OPERTION